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Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking

HIT LOSERS: THE GOOD (FAITH)

the problem until information is inappropriately disclosed results in
little opportunity for a meaningful remedy.
Federal regulations would protect the value placed on control of
PHI by attaching protection to the information itself. It is more
realistic to place restrictions on what can be done with acquired
information than to attempt detailed regulation of this rapidly
evolving industry. 209 While users should also participate in the
protection of their personal information through use of the privacy
settings afforded, deceptive privacy advertisement and obtuse privacy
policies should not render this participation meaningless.
Preemptively establishing a set of federal regulations as a benchmark
for addressing these kinds of issues before they arise will help mitigate
the harms that are otherwise sure to follow. Federal regulations
requiring meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising,
establishing guidelines for use of PHI, and providing causes of action
with precedential value would keep pace with reality of the evolution
of online social networking.
Federal regulations protecting PHI would fill the gap in the
current law, provide meaningful dispute resolution options and
remedies, and delineate concrete expectations for all participants.
The permanence of information posted online heightens the need for
this sort of protection. 210 It is all too likely that information posted
will become a permanent part of an individual's "digital" persona
without the mercy of short human memory. 211 Such a framework will
have broad applicability as more and more interactions move toward
online exchanges.

FIGHT FOR NET-PROFITS PAYMENTS
FROM BLOCKBUSTER HOLLYWOOD
PRODUCTIONS
Max Bialystock: You were saying that, under the right
circumstances, a producer could make more money with a flop
than he could with a hit.
Leo Bloom: Yes. It's quite possible.
Max Bialystock: You keep saying that, but you don't say how!
Leo Bloom: Well, it's simply a matter of creative accounting. 1
Gould: I think conservatively, you and me, we build ourselves
in to split, ten percent. (Pause.)
Fox: Of the net.
Gould: Char. Charlie: Permit me to tell you: two things I've
learned, twenty-five years in the entertainment industry.
Fox: What?
Gould: The two things which are always true.
Fox: One:
Gould: The first one is: there is no net.
Fox: Yeah ... ? (Pause.)
Gould: And I forgot the second one. 2 .

Neal Robin3
I.

INTRODUCTION

Contracts for services on an entertainment project contain many
of the same provisions as those found in any commercial venture.
These contracts include provisions describing the nature of services to
be performed and the compensation to be provided in exchange for
those services during the course of the agreement. Sought-after
Hollywood actors, directors, and producers are able to secure
additional concessions from the studios that hope to gain their
1.
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participation on the project. For these individuals, the standard
contract between Hollywood studios4 and creative talent 5 provides
compensation in addition to a salary in the form of "net profits. "6 If
the entertainment project takes in more revenue than it costs to
produce-after all necessary deductions are made from its budgetthe creative talent will ·collect a percentage of the net profits as set
out in their services agreement. 7
But most films and television series are not financial successes, 8
leaving creative talent to collect only their salaries and move on to
the next project. Back-end compensation, while an important feature
of an ~greement for creative talent, is not always the highest priority.
However, a limited number of projects surpass the studio's most
optimistic expectations and become major blockbusters at the box
office or in the Nielsen ratings. When it becomes apparent that a
project will generate enough revenue to contemplate net-profits
compensation, creative talent will often insist on remuneration. The
process then becomes tricky, as studios resist making net-profits
payments on the assertion that the project did not earn enough
money according to their calculations.
In the entertainment industry, the major studios calculate and
report a project's financial condition using esoteric accounting
practices that differ from those used outside Hollywood. 9 These
calculations frequently reach the conclusion that the film or television
series earned zero profits for those promised compensation contingent
on the project's financial success. 10 Creative talent-who are, in this

circumstance, called profit participants 11 -learn that they will receive
diminished or no contingent compensation for a film that earns
hundreds of millions of dollars at the box office or commands tens of
millions of TV viewers for each new episode. 12 Even though attorneys
and talent representatives lower the creative talent's expectations for
contingent compensation at the outset, they nonetheless complain
that the project has been so profitable that it cannot possibly have
failed to earn enough money to distribute net-profits payments. 13
Critics of Hollywood studios deride this method of accounting, calling
it "Hollywood accounting. "14
This phenomenon has a long tradition in Hollywood.
For
example, the film Batman15 earned more than $250 million at the box
office 16 and was one of the top ten grossing films of all time when
released in 1989. 17 Nevertheless, Warner Brothers, the studio that
produced the film, reported a loss of $36 million. 18 Thus, no payment
of net profits was made to profit participants. 19 When the executive
producers of the film challenged their participation-accounting

4.

The term "Hollywood studio" and its iterations refer to Warner
Brothers, Sony Entertainment Group, Walt Disney Pictures, Twentieth
Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Paramount Pictures, as well as to
boutique production houses such as Lionsgate, The Weinstein Company,
MGM, CBS Films, and Summit.

11.

"Profit participant" is a term used to refer to recipients of net profits,
particularly creative talent and investors in motion pictures and
television series. See, e.g., Sills & Axelrod, supra note 8 (classifying
profit participants as "producers, directors, writers and actors").

12.

See, e.g., COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount 1988), earning roughly $250
million in worldwide box office but showing a loss of $17 million (cited
in Hillary Bibicoff, Net Profit Participations in the Motion Picture
Industry. 11 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 23 (1991). See also Celador Int'l,
Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (profit
participant disputes that his 50-percent share of profits amounted to
zero dollars according to the studio's calculation).

13.

See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 86.

14.

See, e.g., Mike Krasnick, 'Hollywood Accounting' Losing in the Courts,
TECHDIRT (Jul. 8, 2010, 10:07 AM) http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20100708/02510310122.shtml (attaching a balance sheet
enumerating costs and expenses of a blockbuster motion picture
production, including multimillion-dollar 'fees' the studio charges the
production to compensate itself).

5.

The term "creative talent" refers to the actors, directors, writers, and
producers whose talents are displayed to audiences in motion pictures
and television shows.

6.

See EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, THE HOLLYWOOD ECONOMIST: THE HIDDEN
FINANCIAL REALITY BEHIND THE MOVIE INDUSTRY 69 (2010) (explaining
the different forms of compensation in Hollywood).

15.

BATMAN (Warner Bros. 1989).

7.

See infra Part II (detailing the complications involving net profits and
compensation).

16.

"Box office" is the total amount of .money the moviegoers spent on
ticket sales at the theaters.

8.

SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ: THE BASIC BUSINESS, LEGAL AND
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 13 (4th ed. 2011) (estimating
that eighty percent of motion pictures produced by Hollywood studios
lose money).

17.

9.

. See infra Part II(A)(l). See also, Steven D. Sills & Ivan L. Axelrod,
Profit Participation in the Motion Picture Industry, L.A. LAW., Apr.
1989, at 31 (explaining the concept of gross receipts).

Dennis McDougal, A Blockbuster Deficit: 'Batman' Accounts Show a
$25.8-Million Deficit for the Warners Hit That Grossed $253.4 Million;
the Film may Never Show Profit, L.A. TIMES (March 21, 1991),
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-21/entertainment/ca796_1_net-profit (detailing the profits and costs associated with making
the movie).

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

10.

See infra Part II
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participation on the project. For these individuals, the standard
contract between Hollywood studios4 and creative talent 5 provides
compensation in addition to a salary in the form of "net profits. "6 If
the entertainment project takes in more revenue than it costs to
produce-after all necessary deductions are made from its budgetthe creative talent will ·collect a percentage of the net profits as set
out in their services agreement. 7
But most films and television series are not financial successes, 8
leaving creative talent to collect only their salaries and move on to
the next project. Back-end compensation, while an important feature
of an 0greement for creative talent, is not always the highest priority.
However, a limited number of projects surpass the studio's most
optimistic expectations and become major blockbusters at the box
office or in the Nielsen ratings. When it becomes apparent that a
project will generate enough revenue to contemplate net-profits
compensation, creative talent will often insist on remuneration. The
process then becomes tricky, as studios resist making net-profits
payments on the assertion that the project did not earn enough
money according to their calculations.
In the entertainment industry, the major studios calculate and
report a project's financial condition using esoteric accounting
practices that differ from those used outside Hollywood. 9 These
calculations frequently reach the conclusion that the film or television
series earned zero profits for those promised compensation contingent
on the project's financial success. 10 Creative talent-who are, in this

circumstance, called profit participants 11 -learn that they will receive
diminished or no contingent compensation for a film that earns
hundreds of millions of dollars at the box office or commands tens of
millions of TV viewers for each new episode. 12 Even though attorneys
and talent representatives lower the creative talent's expectations for
contingent compensation at the outset, they nonetheless complain
that the project has been so profitable that it cannot possibly have
failed to earn enough money to distribute net-profits payments. 13
Critics of Hollywood studios deride this method of accounting, calling
it "Hollywood accounting. "14
This phenomenon has a long tradition in Hollywood.
For
15
example, the film Batman earned more than $250 million at the box
office 16 and was one of the top ten grossing films of all time when
released in 1989. 17 Nevertheless, Warner Brothers, the studio that
produced the film, reported a loss of $36 million. 18 Thus, no payment
of net profits was made to profit participants. 19 When the executive
producers of the film challenged their participation-accounting
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Brothers, Sony Entertainment Group, Walt Disney Pictures, Twentieth
Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Paramount Pictures, as well as to
boutique production houses such as Lionsgate, The Weinstein Company,
MGM, CBS Films, and Summit.

11.

"Profit participant" is a term used to refer to recipients of net profits,
particularly creative talent and investors in motion pictures and
television series. See, e.g., Sills & Axelrod, supra note 8 (classifying
profit participants as "producers, directors, writers and actors").
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million in worldwide box office but showing a loss of $17 million (cited
in Hillary Bibicoff, Net Profit Participations in the Motion Picture
Industry. 11 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 23 (1991). See also Celador Int'l,
Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (profit
participant disputes that his 50-percent share of profits amounted to
zero dollars according to the studio's calculation).

13.

See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 86.

14.

See, e.g., Mike Krasnick, 'Hollywood Accounting' Losing in the Courts,
TECHDIRT (Jul. 8, 2010, 10:07 AM) http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20100708/02510310122.shtml (attaching a balance sheet
enumerating costs and expenses of a blockbuster motion picture
production, including multimillion-dollar 'fees' the studio charges the
production to compensate itself).

5.

The term "creative talent" refers to the actors, directors, writers, and
producers whose talents are displayed to audiences in motion pictures
and television shows.

6.

See EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, THE HOLLYWOOD ECONOMIST: THE HIDDEN
FINANCIAL REALITY BEHIND THE MOVIE INDUSTRY 69 (2010) (explaining
the different forms of compensation in Hollywood).

15.

BATMAN (Warner Bros. 1989).

7.

See infra Part II (detailing the complications involving net profits and
compensation).

16.

"Box office" is the total amount of .money the moviegoers spent on
ticket sales at the theaters.
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SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ: THE BASIC BUSINESS, LEGAL AND
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 13 (4th ed. 2011) (estimating
that eighty percent of motion pictures produced by Hollywood studios
lose money).

17.

9.

. See infra Part II(A)(l). See also, Steven D. Sills & Ivan L. Axelrod,
Profit Participation in the Motion Picture Industry, L.A. LAW., Apr.
1989, at 31 (explaining the concept of gross receipts).

Dennis McDougal, A Blockbuster Deficit: 'Batman' Accounts Show a
$25.8-Million Deficit for the Warners Hit That Grossed $253.4 Million;
the Film may Never Show Profit, L.A. TIMES (March 21, 1991),
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statements, the court found in favor of the studio, rendering the
producers unable to recover additional compensation. 20
Profit participants have to surmount significant legal hurdles to
recover the share of net profits they expected to earn in connection
with their contracts. The studio-talent relationship is unique in that
it carries duties in addition to those found in ordinary contracts.
Studios take on the duty to collect revenues and distribute net profits
on behalf of profit participants. 21 Participants themselves play no role
in the collection-and-distribution efforts. 22 Thus they are beholden to
studios to calculate their payments completely and properly. In
addition, participants accuse studios of harnessing their superior
bargaining position to play games with a project's financial
statements to the participants' detriment. 23
In its defense, the studios dispute this characterization of their
behavior. They insist that the studio-:participant relationship is
merely a contract for services for which no additional duties are owed
beyond those the contract sets forth. 24 They assert that participants
know precisely how their compensation is measured, since it is
outlined in agreements their representatives negotiated and they
themselves signed. 25 Studios contend that, in filing suit, a participant
is attempting to unwind a contract carrying unfavorable
consequences, which is not a proper judicial function. In defense of
this position are courts themselves, which have recognized and
supported the studio's view in high-profile cases. 26
Disputes surrounding net-profits payments carry high stakes.
Owners of entertainment projects that achieved commercial and
popular success often wish to capitalize on their popularity. They do

so by licensing the intellectual property associated with the
production in several media-including broadcast syndication,
merchandise rights, theme-park attractions, and online distribution. 27
Profit participants stand to earn considerable sums from these
revenue streams, but only a handful of them have the patience and
pocketbooks necessary to support the expense of strenuous legal
battles against sophisticated and deep-pocketed studios. 28 As of late,
a growing number of agreements for creative talent contain provisions
mandating arbitration to resolve disputes surrounding payments of
net profits. 29
Despite long odds, California judges and juries have recently
rendered favorable decisions for profit participants, in each case
finding that the studio took deliberate steps to dodge payment of net
profits. 30 The courts in Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. 31
and Celador International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Company3 2
ordered studios to pay multimillion-dollar judgments because they
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
undermining the participant's expectation of receiving net-profit
compensation for their work on a successful project. 33 But in other
cases California courts have found for the studio, rejecting good-faith
claims by participants where the studio entered into promotional
agreements with third parties for which the studio (and thus the
participant) did not earn monetary compensation. 34 Such narrow but
momentous rulings may spur creative talent to review financial
statements with heightened meticulousness and challenge those
containing suspicious numbers. In addition, recent court decisions
will likely push studios to reexamine how they calculate and report on
a project's profitability. 35

20.

27.

See, e.g., Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 162 Cal.
App.4th 1107 (2008).

28.

See MOORE, supra note 7, at 203 (explaining that litigation is expensive
and should be avoided).

29.

Ted Johnson, Arbitration Clauses Irk Creatives, VARIETY (Oct. 28,
2011,
4:00
AM),
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118045188
(discussing how arbitration clauses are presented in the industry).

Batfilm Prods., Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., Nos. BC 051653 and BC
051654 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding for the studio because the claim
for unfair competition was dependent on finding that "net profits"
contract was unconscionable).

21.

See infra Part II(A)(l) (explaining the process of gross receipts).

22;

See id. ·see also Stanton L. Stein & Marcia J. Harris, Vertically
Challenged, L.A. LAW., May 2003, at 30.

23.

See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Court, 106 Cal. App.4th 25, 28 (2003)
(participant contending the studio used it's exclusive control over
project financials to his detriment).

30.

See Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 184 Cal.App.4th 1298
(2010); Celador Int'l Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F.Supp.2d 846
(C.D.Cal. 2004).

24.

See infra note 105 (explaining fiduciary relationships in contracts).

31.

Ladd, 184 Cal.App.4th 1298.

25.

David Edward Agnew, Profits of Doom: Net Profit Participation
Contracts in the Motion Picture Industry, 15 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS
367, 375 (1991) (explaining the process of making contracts in the
television business)

32.

Celador, 347 F.Supp.2d 846.

33.

See Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1308-12; Celador, 347 F.Supp 2d at 85253.

34.

See infra Part .III(C) (providing examples of relevant case law).

35.

See infra Part IV (discussing the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing).

26.

See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Ct., 106 Cal. App. 4th 25 (2003) (holding the
right to contingent compensation does not alone suffice to create a
fiduciary relationship).
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statements, the court found in favor of the studio, rendering the
producers unable to recover additional compensation. 20
Profit participants have to surmount significant legal hurdles to
recover the share of net profits they expected to earn in connection
with their contracts. The studio-talent relationship is unique in that
it carries duties in addition to those found in ordinary contracts.
Studios take on the duty to collect revenues and distribute net profits
on behalf of profit participants. 21 Participants themselves play no role
in the collection-and-distribution efforts. 22 Thus they are beholden to
studios to calculate their payments completely and· properly. In
addition, participants accuse studios of harnessing their superior
bargaining position to play games with a project's financial
statements to the participants' detriment. 23
In its defense, the studios dispute this characterization of their
behavior. They insist that the studio-,participant relationship is
merely a contract for services for which no additional duties are owed
beyond those the contract sets forth. 24 They assert that participants
know precisely how their compensation is measured, since it is
outlined in agreements their representatives negotiated and they
themselves signed. 25 Studios contend that, in filing suit, a participant
is attempting to unwind a contract carrying unfavorable
consequences, which is not a proper judicial function. In defense of
this position are courts themselves, which have recognized and
supported the studio's view in high-profile cases. 26
Disputes surrounding net-profits payments carry high stakes.
Owners of entertainment projects that achieved commercial and
popular success often wish to capitalize on their popularity. They do

so by licensing the intellectual property associated with the
production in several media-including broadcast syndication,
merchandise rights, theme-park attractions, and online distribution. 27
Profit participants stand to earn considerable sums from these
revenue streams, but only a handful of them have the patience and
pocketbooks necessary to support the expense of strenuous legal
battles against sophisticated and deep-pocketed studios. 28 As of late,
a growing number of agreements for creative talent contain provisions
mandating arbitration to resolve disputes surrounding payments of
net profits. 29
Despite long odds, California judges and juries have recently
rendered favorable decisions for profit participants, in each case
finding that the studio took deliberate steps to dodge payment of net
profits. 30 . The courts in Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. 31
and Celador International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Company3 2
ordered studios to pay multimillion-dollar judgments because they
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
undermining the participant's expectation of receiving net-profit
compensation for their work on a successful project. 33 But in other
cases California courts have found for the studio, rejecting good-faith
claims by participants where the studio entered into promotional
agreements with third parties for which the studio (and thus the
participant) did not earn monetary compensation. 34 Such narrow but
momentous rulings may spur creative talent to review financial
statements with heightened meticulousness and challenge those
containing suspicious numbers. In addition, recent court decisions
will likely push studios to reexamine how they calculate and report on
a project's profitability. 35

20.

27.

See, e.g., Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 162 Cal.
App.4th 1107 (2008).

28.

See MOORE, supra note 7, at 203 (explaining that litigation is expensive
and should be avoided).

29.

Ted Johnson, Arbitration Clauses Irk Creatives, VARIETY (Oct. 28,
2011,
4:00
AM),
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118045188
(discussing how arbitration clauses are presented in the industry).

Batfilm Prods., Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., Nos. BC 051653 and BC
051654 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding for the studio because the claim
for unfair competition was dependent on finding that "net profits"
contract was unconscionable).

21.

See infra Part II(A)(l) (explaining the process of gross receipts).

22;

See id. See also Stanton L. Stein & Marcia J. Harris, Vertically
Challenged, L.A. LAW., May 2003, at 30.

23.

See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Court, 106 Cal. App.4th 25, 28 (2003)
(participant contending the studio used it's exclusive control over
project financials to his detriment).

30.

See Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 184 Cal.App.4th 1298
(2010); Celador Int'l Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F.Supp.2d 846
(C.D.Cal. 2004).

24.

See infra note 105 (explaining fiduciary relationships in contracts).

31.

Ladd, 184 Cal.App.4th 1298.

25.

David Edward Agnew, Profits of Doom: Net Profit Participation
Contracts in the Motion Picture Industry, 15 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS
367, 375 (1991) (explaining the process of making contracts in the
television business)

32.

Celador, 347 F.Supp.2d 846.

33.

See Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1308-12; Celador, 347 F.Supp 2d at 85253.

34.

See infra Part III(C) (providing examples of relevant case law).

35.

See infra Part IV (discussing the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing).

26.

See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Ct., 106 Cal. App. 4th 25 (2003) (holding the
right to contingent compensation does not alone suffice to create a
fiduciary relationship).
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The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it examines how
profit-participation agreements are structured. Second, it explains
court decisions where these agreements were challenged on the bases
of either breach of fiduciary duty or the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Section II explains the term "net profits" and
describes factors influencing a participant's ability to earn such
compensation. Section III analyzes how participants, at least initially,
failed to persuade courts that the right of contingent compensation
gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. It goes on to describe how
courts have been backing away from this position; indeed, courts have
demonstrated willingness for fiduciary-duty claims to proceed beyond
the pleading stage. Section IV discusses decisions where courts found
violations of the implied covenant in profit-participation agreements.
This Note concludes by suggesting a legal theory of contingent
compensation that may inform parties as they decide whether to have
a legal forum resolve their disputes. It suggests that a contractual
right of contingent compensation should include an implied right of
reasonable access to financial information and an accounting of
revenues that is reasonably accurate under the circumstances. It also
asserts that creative talent will struggle to convince a court that a
studio impliedly owes talent fiduciary duties on the basis of a
contractual right of contingent compensation-unless talent
demonstrates that the studio-talent relationship is legally cognizable
as fiduciary. Such a finding requires more than a contractual right of
contingent compensation.

what the parties bargained for in each agreement. 38 Generally the
term provides for the deduction of a project's gross receipts-the total
amount of revenue a project has generated-and certain expenses
incurred in the course of production. 39 These expenses are also
defined in the contract, but are typically called "production costs,"
"distribution fees," and "distribution ·expenses." 40 But the baseline
measure from which contingent compensation will be calculated can
also vary by agreement. For instance, it is not uncommon for
contingent compensation to be based on a project's "adjusted gross
receipts," "gross receipts after break-even," and the like. 41
Since these defined terms contain many of the same words and
sound similar to each other, it is not uncornrnon for profit participants
to misunderstand which revenue streams are included in calculations
of net profits. And when profit participants complain that the
participation statement contains inaccurate or incomplete payments
of contingent compensation, the meaning of net profits becomes a
kind of Rorschach test for opposing parties to dispute. Put simply,
participants want a high figure reported while studios want to report
a low figure. 42
Participants complain that the definition of net profits is poorly
written and a nightmare to decipher once the amount is ·a source of
dispute. 43 Since the term lacks clarity, it invites studios to play
games with the numbers; thus, studios can pay any amount of
contingent compensation while maintaining fidelity to the formula set
forth in the agreement. 44 As such, every lawyer who negotiates his
client's participation agreement should fully understand how the
payment is measured. 45 Calculating back-end compensation should
Disputes
therefore be a matter of straightforward arithmetic.

II.

NET PROFITS

"When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean." Humpty Dumpty36
A.

Nothing But Net: An Overview of Net Profits and Hollywood
Accounting

"Net profits" refers broadly to the wealth an entertainment
project has accumulated after specified expenses are deducted from its
budget. 37 As a term defined in an agreement, net profits contains no
fixed meaning as a matter of law; instead, its meaning depends on

36.

37.

LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS 106 (2011) (cited in Schuyler Moore, Do You Know
Your Showbiz Terms?, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jul. 1, 2010, 10:36
AM),
http://reporter.blogs.com/thresq/2010/07/do-you-know-yourshowbiz-deal-terms.html (stating that a word should be used in its true
meaning, although it often has other meanings in the entertainment
industry).

See MOORE, supra note 7, at 7 (providing a definition of net profits).

450

38.

See, e.g., Roman Silberfeld and Bernice Conn, The Red and the Black,
L.A. LAW., May 2011, at 39 (explaining that several contractual
definitions are used to explain net profits, including but not limited to,
"defined proceeds," "contingent proceeds," "defined receipts," "defined
contingent compensation," and "contingent bonus."). Although there is
no "standard net profit participation agreement," the contracts of major
studios contain similar terms and formulae.

39.

See id.

40.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 9 (providing definitions)

41.

Id. at 149.

42.

See id.

43.

See Tim Connors, Beleaguered Accounting: Should the Film Industry
Abandon its Net Profits Formula? 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 842-43 (1997)
(explaining the current net profits formula).

44.

See id.

45.

Id.
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The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it examines how
profit-participation agreements are structured. Second, it explains
court decisions where these agreements were challenged on the bases
of either breach of fiduciary duty or the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Section II explains the term "net profits" and
describes factors influencing a participant's ability to earn such
compensation. Section III analyzes how participants, at least initially,
failed to persuade courts that the right of contingent compensation
gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. It goes on to describe how
courts have been backing away from this position; indeed, courts have
demonstrated willingness for fiduciary-duty claims to proceed beyond
the pleading stage. Section IV discusses decisions where courts found
violations of the implied covenant in profit-participation agreements.
This Note concludes by suggesting a legal theory of contingent
compensation that may inform parties as they decide whether to have
a legal forum resolve their disputes. It suggests that a contractual
right of contingent compensation should include an implied right of
reasonable access to financial information and an accounting of
revenues that is reasonably accurate under the circumstances. It also
asserts that creative talent will struggle to convince a court that a
studio impliedly owes talent fiduciary duties on the basis of a
contractual right of contingent compensation-unless talent
demonstrates that the studio-talent relationship is legally cognizable
as fiduciary. Such a finding requires more than a contractual right of
contingent compensation.

what the parties bargained for in each agreement. 38 Generally the
term provides for the deduction of a project's gross receipts-the total
amount of revenue a project has generated-and certain expenses
incurred in the course of production. 39 These expenses are also
defined in the contract, but are typically called "production costs,"
"distribution fees," and "distribution ·expenses. "40 But the baseline
measure from which contingent compensation will be calculated can
also vary by agreement. For instance, it is not uncommon for
contingent compensation to be based on a project's "adjusted gross
receipts," "gross receipts after break-even," and the like. 41
Since these defined terms contain many of the same words and
sound similar to each other, it is not uncommon for profit participants
to misunderstand which revenue streams are included in calculations
of net profits. And when profit participants complain that the
participation statement contains inaccurate or incomplete payments
of contingent compensation, the meaning of net profits becomes a
kind of Rorschach test for opposing parties to dispute. Put simply,
participants want a high figure reported while studios want to report
a low figure. 42
Participants complain that the definition of net profits is poorly
written and a nightmare to decipher once the amount is a source of
dispute. 43 Since the term lacks clarity, it invites studios to play
games with the numbers; thus, studios can pay any amount of
contingent compensation while maintaining fidelity to the formula set
forth in the agreement. 44 As such, every lawyer who negotiates his
client's participation agreement should fully understand how the
payment is measured. 45 Calculating back-end compensation should
Disputes
therefore be a matter of straightforward arithmetic.

II.

NET PROFITS

"When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean." Humpty Dumpt'fi3 6
A.

Nothing But Net: An Overview of Net Profits and Hollywood
Accounting

"Net profits" refers broadly to the wealth an entertainment
project has accumulated after specified expenses are deducted from its
budget. 37 As a term defined in an agreement, net profits contains no
fixed meaning as a matter of law; instead, its meaning depends on

36.

37.

38.

See, e.g., Roman Silberfeld and Bernice Conn, The Red and the Black,
L.A. LAW., May 2011, at 39 (explaining that several contractual
definitions are used to explain net profits, including but not limited to,
"defined proceeds," "contingent proceeds," "defined receipts," "defined
contingent compensation," and "contingent bonus."). Although there is
no "standard net profit participation agreement," the contracts of major
studios contain similar terms and formulae.

39.

See id.

40.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 9 (providing definitions)

LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS 106 (2011) (cited in Schuyler Moore, Do You Know
Your Showbiz Terms?, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jul. 1, 2010, 10:36
AM),
http://reporter.blogs.com/thresq/2010/07/do-you-know-yourshowbiz-deal-terms.html (stating that a word should be used in its true
meaning, although it often has other meanings in the entertainment
industry).

41.

Id. at 149.

42.

See id.

43.

See Tim Connors, Beleaguered Accounting: Should the Film Industry
Abandon its Net Profits Formula? 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 842-43 (1997)
(explaining the current net profits formula).

44.

See id.

See MOORE, supra note 7, at 7 (providing a definition of net profits).

45.

Id.
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surrounding the appropriate measure of contingent compensation have
prompted a great amount of litigation. 46

disproportionate amount of the licensing fee to the flops to minimize
the amount calculated for purposes of net-profits payments owed to
participants in successful films. 54
Tactics similar to straight lining arise in the context of calculating
revenues earned from the sale of home videos and DVDs. As Moore
notes, the industry practice is to include twenty percent of gross
receipts from such sales for purposes of paying profit participants. 55 A
participant is entitled to a fraction of those earnings as the basis for
calculating his payment of net profits. 56 The major studios tap
affiliates to sell DVDs to wholesalers or retailers, and the studio will
then likely use the remaining funds to pay the expenses of
manufacturing, marketing, and distributing the DVDs and keeps the
profits. 57 For purposes of illustration, if a film earns $100 from the
sale of home videos, a participant entitled to five percent of net
profits earns five percent of $20, not five percent of $100, reducing the
prospect of contingent compensation.

1.

Gross Receipts: How Studios Minimize the Amount of Contingent
Compensation Owed to Participants

For Hollywood studios, any given film or television series counts
only as one of many investment projects. According to Schuyler
Moore, a prominent Hollywood attorney, a studio's financial interests
dictate the formula used to calculate a project's financial condition,
rather than a desire for a precise snapshot of its finances. 47 For
instance, for purposes of gross receipts, studios want to accelerate the
payment of expenses and delay the reporting of payments as long as
possible because the time value of money makes the total cash
available to make distributions less valuable. 48
Until Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 49 studios
minimized the amount of gross receipts generated by a project by
allocating income away fro;m hit films to those that were not financial
successes through a practice known as "straight lining. nso Licensing
fees derived from packaging a slate of films to license to cable
companies for broadcast is a source of studio income. 51 Revenues
earned from the licensing package have to be allocated to the films
that formed the package. For purposes of illustration only, the
blockbuster film Titanic5 2 might be included in the same package as
the film John Carter, 53 a prominent box-office disappointment.
Despite the disparity in success, the studios, given their proximity to
financial information, have the opportunity to allocate a
46.

See, e.g., Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 706083, 1992 WL
1462910, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992 ("In the second phase of the trial
the court decided, inter alia, that certain provisions of Paramount's net
profit formula were unconscionable."); Batfilm Prods., Inc. v. Warner
Bros., Inc., Nos. BC 051653 and BC 051654 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994)
(explaining that plaintiff failed to show contract's net profits provision
was unconscionable); Complaint, Estate of Garrison v. Warner Bros.,
Inc., CIV. CV 95-8328 RMT, 1996 WL 407849 (G.D. Cal. June 25,
1996) (settling for an undisclosed sum); see also, Alperson v. Mirisch
Co., Inc., 250 Cal. App.2d 84, 90-91 (1967) (discussing the difference
between gross and net profit participations).

47.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 149 (introducing the various methods studios
use to calculate project financials).

48.

Id.

49.

184 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010).

50.

See infra Part IV.C.

51.

See infra Part IV.C

52.

TITANIC (Twentieth Century Fox 1997).

53.

JOHN CARTER (Disney 2012).
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2.

The standard contract contains language allowing the studio to
deduct the cost of production. 58 For a film production, a studio does
not incur expenses for use of its facilities, but will nevertheless assign
costs for using the sound stages, equipment, etc. that is greatly in
excess of the actual costs. 59
Practices that are more controversial include charging fees that
bear no reasonable relation to the actual costs incurred and erroneous
calculations that place productions in the red when they should be in
the black. For instance, in a suit filed against Warner Brothers, the
film producer Alan Ladd, Jr. claimed the studio assigned costs to the

54.

See infra Part III.B.

55.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 151.

56.

Id.

57.

See, e.g., Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 37, at 36 ("Vertically integrated
media conglomerates own most of the entities involved in the
production, distribution, and merchandising of properties, so it is not
difficult for them to manipulate the accountings to ensure that no
contingent compensation ever will be shared with profit participants").

58.

Joseph F. Hart & Philip J. Hacker, Less than Zero, L.A. LAW., Apr.
1996, at 34, 38 ("The [Standard Profit Definition] contains language
that permits the studio to deduct the cost of production, determined in
the customary manner producer accounts for production cost at the
time the picture is produced.").

59.

See id.
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surrounding the appropriate measure of contingent compensation have
prompted a great amount of litigation. 46

disproportionate amount of the licensing fee to the flops to minimize
the amount calculated for purposes of net-profits payments owed to
participants in successful films. 54
Tactics similar to straight lining arise in the context of calculating
revenues earned from the sale of home videos and DVDs. As Moore
notes, the industry practice is to include twenty percent of gross
receipts from such sales for purposes of paying profit participants. 55 A
participant is entitled to a fraction of those earnings as the basis for
calculating his payment of net profits. 56 The major studios tap
affiliates to sell DVDs to wholesalers or retailers, and the studio will
then likely use the remaining funds to pay the expenses of
manufacturing, marketing, and distributing the DVDs and keeps the
profits. 57 For purposes of illustration, if a film earns $100 from the
sale of home videos, a participant entitled to five percent of net
profits earns five percent of $20, not five percent of $100, reducing the
prospect of contingent compensation.

1.

Gross Receipts: How Studios Minimize the Amount of Contingent
Compensation Owed to Participants

For Hollywood studios, any given film or television series counts
only as one of many investment projects. According to Schuyler
Moore, a prominent Hollywood attorney, a studio's financial interests
dictate the formula used to calculate a project's financial condition,
rather than a desire for a precise snapshot of its finances. 47 For
instance, for purposes of gross receipts, studios want to accelerate the
payment of expenses and delay the reporting of payments as long as
possible because the time value of money makes the total cash
available to make distributions less valuable. 48
Until Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 49 studios
minimized the amount of gross receipts generated by a project by
allocating income away fro;rn hit films to those that were not financial
successes through a practice known as "straight lining. "50 Licensing
fees derived from packaging a slate of films to license to cable
companies for broadcast is a source of studio income. 51 Revenues
earned from the licensing package have to be allocated to the films
that formed the package. For purposes of illustration only, the
blockbuster film Titanic5 2 might be included in the same package as
the film John Carter, 53 a prominent box-office disappointment.
Despite the disparity in success, the studios, given their proximity to
financial information, have the opportunity to allocate a
46.

47.

See, e.g., Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 706083, 1992 WL
1462910, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992 ("In the second phase of the trial
the court decided, inter alia, that certain provisions of Paramount's net
profit formula were unconscionable."); Batfilm Prods., Inc. v. Warner
Bros., Inc., Nos. BC 051653 and BC 051654 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994)
(explaining that plaintiff failed to show contract's net profits provision
was unconscionable); Complaint, Estate of Garrison v. Warner Bros.,
Inc., CIV. CV 95-8328 RMT, 1996 WL 407849 (C,D. Cal. June 25,
1996) (settling for an undisclosed sum); see also, Alperson v. Mirisch
Co., Inc., 250 Cal. App.2d 84, 90-91 (1967) (discussing the difference
between gross and net profit participations).

The standard contract contains language allowing the studio to
deduct the cost of production. 58 For a film production, a studio does
not incur expenses for use of its facilities, but will nevertheless assign
costs for using the sound stages, equipment, etc. that is greatly in
excess of the actual costs. 59
Practices that are more controversial include charging fees that
bear no reasonable relation to the actual costs incurred and erroneous
calculations that place productions in the red when they should be in
the black. For instance, in a suit filed against Warner Brothers, the
film producer Alan Ladd, Jr. claimed the studio assigned costs to the

54.

See infra Part III.B.

55.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 151.

56.

Id.

57.

See, e.g., Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 37, at 36 ("Vertically integrated
media conglomerates own most of the entities involved in the
production, distribution, and merchandising of properties, so it is not
difficult for them to manipulate the accountings to ensure that no
contingent compensation ever will be shared with profit participants").

58.

Joseph F. Hart & Philip J. Hacker, Less than Zero, L.A. LAW., Apr.
1996, at 34, 38 ("The [Standard Profit Definition] contains language
that permits the studio to deduct the cost of production, determined in
the customary manner producer accounts for production cost at the
time the picture is produced.").

59.

See id.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 149 (introducing the various methods studios

use to calculate project financials).
48.

Id.

49.

184 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010).

50.

See infra Part IV.C.

51.

See infra Part IV.C

52.

TITANIC (Twentieth Century Fox 1997).

53.

JOHN CARTER (Disney 2012).
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production of the film Blade Runner without explanation. 60 Upon
audit, it was revealed that the studio accounted improperly for the
negative cost (i.e., the cost of making the movie) of the film by
charging Ladd the full amount of the production payment ($15.8
million) instead of his portion of the payment ($7.9 million). 61

$100,000, depending on the size of the production. 68 The auditor's
findings serve as the basis of protracted negotiations to correct errors
or make additional allocations to the participant. Errors that are
revealed upon audit range from those that are clerical in nature-and
fixed by the studio without complaint-to those that seem
intentional. 69 Yet an auditor's findings are limited, since participants
are deprived of complete access to the financial records. 70 As a
practical matter, representatives of the studio and the participant
negotiate a settlement for a fraction of what the participant claims to
be entitled to in connection with his contract. 71

B.

Roadblocks Encountered by Participants in Obtaining an Accurate
and Complete Calculation of Contingent Compensation

Creative talent are highly suspicious of how studios arrive at
financial conclusions because studios negotiate transactions for
licensing the intellectual property of the project and allocate netprofits payments on the basis of revenues collected and calculated
internally. 62 Talent does not have the bargaining power to negotiate
changes of any material provisions of a net-profits formula. 63
However, it is customary for studios to grant participants a limited
right to audit the project's books and records. 64 Financial statements
are delivered to participants on a quarterly or semi-annual basis,
For participants,
reporting the project's income statement. 65
exercising the right to audit provides an opportunity to cure reporting
errors on the studio's accounting statements-but they are not
provided access to every financial record. 66
Despite having the right to audit, inspecting a project's books and
records is a time-consuming and costly endeavor. Participants who
exercise their right to audit wait as long as eighteen months to gain
access to financial records67 at a cost ranging from $20,000 to

60.

Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc.,., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298, 1301-03
(2010) (discussing the history of the dispute and Ladd's assertions of
improper cost assignment).

61.

Combined Respondents' Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at
88, Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010)
(No. B204015), 2009 WL 899836.

62.

It is worth noting that this arrangement is not unlike a manufacturerdistributor relationship in any other industry, where A hires B to
distribute A's product. B distributes the product to X, Y, and Z. A
then pays B a portion of the proceeds. Or a lessor-lessee relationship
where a tenant pays his pro-rata share of utilities based on the
building's total utilities bill. The tenant can audit the landlord's books
if he bargains for an audit right.

63.

See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 (discussing how studios employ
methods to retain nearly all the power in the studio-talent relationship).

64.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 154-55.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.
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C.

Forms of Hollywood Accounting

Hollywood accounting practices differ from those generally utilized
in other commercial industries.
Generally Accepted Accounting
Practices (GAAP) govern the procedures of reporting costs and
revenues in most commercial industries to enable a firm's board of
directors to hold managers responsive to shareholders for their
performance. 72 Instead of GAAP, the film and television industries
are supposed to follow the guidelines set forth in the Financial
Accounting Standards Bulletin 53 (FASE 53), which encourages
studios and television networks to use the accrual method of
Under the accrual method of
accounting in .its productions. 73

68.

Telephone Interview with Stanton L. Stein, Partner, Dreier Stein Kahan
Browne Woods George LLP, Mar. 1, 2012.

69.

Id.

70.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 155 ("[A]uditors are spoon-fed limited books
and records of the film company (and not of its affiliates). For example,
auditors are almost never given access to the general ledger or
underlying contracts that would show unreported income or rebates.").

71.

Stein Interview, supra note 67.

72.

See, e.g., Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 37, at 39 ("For example, in
[Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846 (C.D. Cal.
2004)], an incomplete, two-page exhibit describes 'defined contingent
compensation' in the contract among Celador, ABC, and Buena Vista
Television. The description states, in part: 'For purposes of Defined
Contingent Compensation, Participant agrees that words and phrases
used in connection with Participant's contingent participation, if any,
are . . . not intended to correspond to any conventional understanding
or dictionary definition of such words and terms, whether used in the
entertainment industry or any other industry or business and are not
intended to correspond in any way to generally accepted accounting
principles [GAAP], or any other meanings thereof, which may be
associated with the practices of accounting or auditing."').

73.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 53, FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. (1981).
.
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production of the film Blade Runner without explanation. 60 Upon
audit, it was revealed that the studio accounted improperly for the
negative cost (i.e., the cost of making the movie) of the film by
charging Ladd the full amount of the production payment ($15.8
million) instead of his portion of the payment ($7.9 million) .61

$100,000, depending on the size of the production. 68 The auditor's
findings serve as the basis of protracted negotiations to correct errors
or make additional allocations to the participant. Errors that are
revealed upon audit range from those that are clerical in nature-and
fixed by the studio without complaint-to those that seem
intentional. 69 Yet an auditor's findings are limited, since participants
are deprived of complete access to the financial records. 70 As a
practical matter, representatives of the studio and the participant
negotiate a settlement for a fraction of what the participant claims to
be entitled to in connection with his contract. 71

B.

Roadblocks Encountered by Participants in Obtaining an Accurate
and Complete Calculation of Contingent Compensation

Creative talent are highly suspicious of how studios arrive at
financial conclusions because studios negotiate transactions for
licensing the intellectual property of the project and allocate netprofits payments on the basis of revenues collected and calculated
internally. 62 Talent does not have the bargaining power to negotiate
changes of any material provisions of a net-profits formula. 63
However, it is customary for studios to grant participants a limited
right to audit the project's books and records. 64 Financial statements
are delivered to participants on a quarterly or semi-annual basis,
For participants,
reporting the project's income statement. 65
exercising the right to audit provides an opportunity to cure reporting
errors on the studio's accounting statements-but they are not
provided access to every financial record. 66
Despite having the right to audit, inspecting a project's books and
records is a time-consuming and costly endeavor. Participants who
exercise their right to audit wait as long as eighteen months to gain
access to financial records67 at a cost ranging from $20,000 to

60.

61.

Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc.:., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298, 1301-03
(2010) (discussing the history of the dispute and Ladd's assertions of
improper cost assignment).
Combined Respondents' Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at
88, Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010)
(No. B204015), 2009 WL 899836.

62.

It is worth noting that this arrangement is not unlike a manufacturerdistributor relationship in any other industry, where A hires B to
distribute A's product. B distributes the product to X, Y, and Z. A
then pays B a portion of the proceeds. Or a lessor-lessee relationship
where a tenant pays his pro-rata share of utilities based on the
building's total utilities bill. The tenant can audit the landlord's books
if he bargains for an audit right.

63.

See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 (discussing how studios employ
methods to retain nearly all the power in the studio-talent relationship).

64.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 154-55.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.
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Hollywood accounting practices differ from those generally utilized
in other commercial industries.
Generally Accepted Accounting
Practices (GAAP) govern the procedures of reporting costs and
revenues in most commercial industries to enable a firm's board of
directors to hold managers responsive to shareholders for their
performance. 72 Instead of GAAP, the film and television industries
are supposed to follow the guidelines set forth in the Financial
Accounting Standards Bulletin 53 (FASE 53), which encourages
studios and television networks to use the accrual method of
Under the accrual method of
accounting in .its productions. 73

68.

Telephone Interview with Stanton L. Stein, Partner, Dreier Stein Kahan
Browne Woods George LLP, Mar. 1, 2012.

69.

Id.

70.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 155 (" [A]uditors are spoon-fed limited books
and records of the film company (and not of its affiliates). For example,
auditors are almost never given access to the general ledger or
underlying contracts that would show unreported income or rebates.").

71.

Stein Interview, supra note 67. -

72.

See, e.g., Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 37, at 39 ("For example, in
[Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846 (C.D. Cal.
2004)], an incomplete, two-page exhibit describes 'defined contingent
compensation' in the contract among Celador, ABC, and Buena Vista
Television. The description states, in part: 'For purposes of Defined
Contingent Compensation, Participant agrees that words and phrases
used in connection with Participant's contingent participation, if any,
are . . . not intended to correspond to any conventional understanding
or dictionary definition of such words and terms, whether used in the
entertainment industry or any other industry or business and are not
intended to correspond in any way to generally accepted a~counting
principles [GAAP], or any other meanings thereof, which may be
associated with the practices of accounting or auditing.'").

73.

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 53, FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD. (1981).
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accounting, an entity records revenues on its balance sheet when they
are earned and records expenses when they are incurred. 74
But studios and participants abandon these guidelines regarding
net-profits payments and instead agree to have the agreement itself
dictate the method of calculation, often removing the protections
Given
shareholders enjoy through GAAP and FASB 53. 75
considerable leeway, studios can maintain and report financial
statements disclosing different sets of numbers to shareholders and
participants. Attorney Bruce Belenky has explained how a studio can
minimize its obligation to pay contingent compensation:
[The studio] may recognize revenue when it is actually received,
while taking expenses when incurred. [That means that when a
studio licenses a project to a third party, the studio] may not count
the license fee as revenue until they actually receive it. Even when
they receive a non-refundable advance, they might not count it as
income until the time of the broadcast. Meanwhile, they count
expenses as soon as they are incurred, even if they have not paid
them. This mismatching of revenues and expenses allows the [studio]
to delay payment to participants. 76

syndication to cable companies that share a corporate parent. 80
Vertical integration enabled Disney to control television programs like
Who Wants to be a Millionaire?3 1 through subsidiary companies, 82 all
under a previously prohibited ownership structure.
Critics of vertical integration argue that this ownership model
allows an integrated company to "dictate the financial terms of
distribution and syndication because it controls the licensor and
licensee of the rights in the property. "83 Profit participants complain
that integrated companies use leverage to structure transactions in a
manner that delays, diverts, or eliminates payments of contingent
compensation. 84 Some profit participants have even filed suit against
studios, alleging that the studio or network did not seek the highest
possible licensing fee for broadcast rights as it could have obtained if
affiliated companies did not sit on each side of the bargaining table. 85

D.

Vertical Integration

In the television industry, the consolidation of media companies
into a small number of vertically integrated companies has enabled
studios and television networks to produce and broadcast programs
that they themselves own. 77 After the repeal of the Financial Interest
and Syndication Rules 78 in 1995, 79 a studio-such as Walt Disney
Pictures-could acquire a television network-such as ABC-which in
turn could acquire a distribution arm-such as Buena Vista
Television-that designates a production company to produce and
license a television show for broadcast on networks and later for

74.

Hart & Hacker, supra note 57, at 36.

75.

Id.

76.

Bruce Belenky, Film Studio Accounting Issues, BELENKY LAW (Jan. 19,
2012), http://belenkylaw.com/2012/01/film-studio-accounting-issues/.

77.

See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 (describing how vertical
integration allows conglomerates to control the process of producing and
distributing media).

78.

47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1970) (restricting the number of programs a
network could own on its prime time television schedule, prohibiting
networks from syndicating the programs they owned, and preventing
them from sharing in profits).

79.

See Broad. Serv.; Television Station Ownership, 60 Fed. Reg. 58, 15688
(Mar. 27, 1995) (allowing television networks to own, produce,
distribute, and syndicate programs without restriction).
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E. Rising Costs of Production and Novel Forms of Payment of
Contingent Compensation Reduce Probability for Net-Profits Participants
to Collect Payment

Since most films and television series produced in Hollywood fail
to earn a positive return on its investment, studios offer the promise
of contingent compensation so talent can share in a project's financial
success. 86 Moore puts the matter simply: "Most films lose money!" 87
In the television industry, it is customary for a network television
show-one airing on ABC, NBC, CBS, or FOX-to air 100 original

80.

Id.

81.

Who Wants to Be A Millionaire'? (Valleycrest Prod. 1999). Each of the
entities identified in this example was an affiliate or subsidiary of The
Walt Disney Co. when Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? was produced.

82.

See, e.g., Celador Int'l v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 850
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that ABC and Buena Vista Television are
both subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Co. and that these subsidiaries
control Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?).

83.

See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 ("In this way, the parent
corporation of both the affiliated licensor and licensee can manipulate
their negotiations tci best serve the corporation's interest.").

84.

Id. at 34-35 (noting that studios have a great deal of leverage of clients
in the contract negotiation process).

85.

Id. at 32 (listing self-dealing claims brought by profit participants
against media conglomerates that ultimately settled out of court).

86.

Id.

87.

See MOORE, supra note 7, at 13 (claiming that 803 of movies fail to
recoup their production and distribution costs); Sills & Axelrod, supra
note 8, at 31 (estimating the standard studio contract results in profits
for the participant in less than five percent of all films released).
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accounting, an entity records revenues on its balance sheet when they
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to delay payment to participants. 76

syndication to cable companies that share a corporate parent. 80
Vertical integration enabled Disney to control television programs like
Who Wants to be a Millionaire?3 1 through subsidiary companies, 82 all
under a previously prohibited ownership structure.
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D.

Vertical Integration
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license a television show for broadcast on networks and later for

74.

Hart & Hacker, supra note 57, at 36.

75.

Id.

76.

Bruce Belenky, Film Studio Accounting Issues, BELENKY LAW (Jan. 19,
2012), http://belenkylaw.com/2012/01/film-studio-accounting-issues/.

77.

See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 (describing how vertical
integration allows conglomerates to control the process of producing and
distributing media).

78.

47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1970) (restricting the number of programs a
network could own on its prime time television schedule, prohibiting
networks from syndicating the programs they owned, and preventing
them from sharing in profits).

79.

See Broad. Serv.; Television Station Ownership, 60 Fed. Reg. 58, 15688
(Mar. 27, 1995) (allowing television networks to own, produce,
distribute, and syndicate programs without restriction).
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episodes or more to gain access to the lucrative syndication market. 88
Hit projects offset the losses incurred from failures, incentivizing
owners to limit contingent compensation paid to profit participants. 89
The result is a paradox. Disputes over payment of contingent
compensation arise most frequently when a project is a blockbuster
success, meaning it is unlikely for a studio to avoid payment by
claiming that there is no pool of net profits from which to draw funds.
Additionally, the likelihood that a film or television show will
yield net profits has diminished as a result of rising production and
distribution costs and increasing payments to high-profile creative
In 2004, the Motion Picture Association of American ·
talent. 90
announced that the average cost of a Hollywood motion picture
Star actors and directors like Arnold
exceeded $100 million. 91
Schwarzenegger and Steven Spielberg have the power to influence
which films end up in theatres and to demand contingent
compensation based on a film's gross receipts, regardless of the film's
net profits. 92
Outside of gross-participation agreements for megawatt
celebrities, even star actors face obstacles in recouping profits. 93 For
instance, actor Leonardo DiCaprio faced this problem following the
blockbuster success of Titanic. DiCaprio earned $1.8 million plus 183
of net profits in connection with the film. Yet, after it earned a total
of $2 billion in global box office receipts and won the 1997 Academy
Award for Best Picture, the film's studio told DiCaprio that he would
not receive a net profits payment because Titanic did not earn a
profit (for his next film, DiCaprio received a guaranteed salary of $20
million). 94 After the film Good Will Hunting9 5 earned $226 million in

worldwide box office, actor Ben Affleck recalled, "[W]e had gotten an
accounting statement that said the movie was $50 million in the red,
and it was just like, This is fucked! You had to do some great
accounting to hide net profits on that movie. "96

88.

See Eric Hynes, Tube Tied, SLATE (Dec. 23, 2009, 9:38 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/12/t
ube_tied.html ("Stations are traditionally interested in acquiring firstrun syndication rights only once a series has amassed 100 episodes").

89.

Connors, supra note 42, at 843 (noting "suspicion and resentment
continue to surround the net profits formula, now derisively referred to
as "Hollywood accounting").

90.

Id. at 847 (analyzing the current net profits formula).

91.

Hollywood film budgets top $100m, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2004, 3:35 PM)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3564377.stm (reporting the
average cost per movie for production and distribution was $64 million
and $39 million respectively).

92.

See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that talent agencies increased
movie star compensation by eschewing long-term contracts for singleproject contracts).

93.

94.

SHERRl L. BURR & WILLIAM D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES
AND MATERJALS ON FILM, TELEVISION, AND MUSIC 269, n. 3 (West 4th
ed. 2004) (discussing compensation based on net profits).

Id.
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III.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE STUDIO-PARTICIPANT
RELATIONSHIP

A fiduciary relationship exists where one of the parties has a
professional duty to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of
the other party. 97 The relationship is "founded upon the trust and
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of
another" and prohibits the duty-holder from exploiting his position
In commercial relationships, such as those
for personal gain. 98
between attorneys and clients, trustees and beneficiaries, partners in a
partnership, and members of a joint venture, fiduciary duties arise as
a matter of law. 99 Outside of those formal relationships, where no
fiduciary relationship is stipulated in the parties' agreement, such
du:ties may arise by the conduct of the parties. 100
Fiduciary obligations create a higher standard of care than those
between parties to an ordinary contract. 101 The justification for a
heightened standard of care is based on the parties' exposure to
95.

GOOD WILL HUNTING (Miramax 1997).

96.

PETER BISKIND, DOWN AND DIRTY PICTURES: MIRAMAX, SUNDANCE, AND
THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT FILM 310 (2004) (describing how the profit
participants in Good Will Hunting would have been required to pay for
an audit if they wanted to contest the amount paid to them under their
contingent compensation agreement).

97.

See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409, 426 (1937) (inquiring
into the confidential nature of the relationships between the parties
involved); In re Marriage of Varner, 55 Cal. App. 4th 128, 141 (1997)
(analyzing fiduciary duties between spouses). See also Celador Int'l Ltd.
v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 854 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (denying
Defendant's motion for dismissal of a breach of fiduciary claim because
"[p]laintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove a joint venture
existed by virtue of the conduct of the parties.").

98.

Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App.3d 648, 654 (1983)
(analyzing the manufacturer-distributor relationship in the fiduciary
duty context).

99.

37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud And Deceit § 32 (2001) (defining a fiduciary or
confidential relationship).

100. Id. (discussing fiduciary relationships where "the relation and the duties
involved ... need not be of a legal character, but may be moral, social,
domestic, or merely personal").
101. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (Cardozo, J.)
("Joint-adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty").
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a matter of law. 99 Outside of those formal relationships, where no
fiduciary relationship is stipulated in the parties' agreement, such
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95.
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96.
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participants in Good Will Hunting would have been required to pay for
an audit if they wanted to contest the amount paid to them under their
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into the confidential nature of the relationships between the parties
involved); In re Marriage of Varner, 55 Cal. App. 4th 128, 141 (1997)
(analyzing fiduciary duties between spouses). See also Celador Int'l Ltd.
v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 854 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (denying
Defendant's motion for dismissal of a breach of fiduciary claim because
"[p]laintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove a joint venture
existed by virtue of the conduct of the parties.").

98.

Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App.3d 648, 654 (1983)
(analyzing the manufacturer-distributor relationship in the fiduciary
duty context).

99.
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100. Id. (discussing fiduciary relationships where "the relation and the duties
involved ... need not be of a legal character, but may be moral, social,
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opportunities where the fiduciary could betray the trust of the
beneficiary, claiming an opportunity for himself without sharing
information with the beneficiary and thereby depriving the beneficiary
of the relationship benefits. 102
Profit participants routinely allege that the studio-participant
relationship is a fiduciary relationship extending beyond those
contemplated in an ordinary employer-employee relationship. 103 Profit
participants argue they are entitled to heightened protections because
studios take on the duty to collect revenues and distribute profits on
behalf of participants, who play no role in the collection and
distribution efforts. 104 The profit participant relies on the studio to
provide good faith and accurate profit reporting in connection with
his contractual right to contingent compensation. 105 The studio's
exclusive control of the monies should give rise to a fiduciary
relationship, because participants repose trust in the studio to provide
revenue accounting. 106 However, a fiduciary relationship between
studios and profit participants would likely impose duties on the
studio that undermine its negotiated terms in participation
agreements.
Profit-participation agreements are either silent on
forming a fiduciary relationship or disclaim explicitly any such
relationship. 107
In litigation, participants often lose breach of fiduciary duty
claims on the pleadings, as it is difficult to demonstrate that a studioparticipant contractual relationship is more than an ordinary contract
bargained for at arm's length. 108
In an ordinary contractual
relationship, the parties do not owe each other any duties beyond
102. Id. ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace."). See also Robert Flannigan, Commercial Fiduciary
Obligation, 36 ALBERTA. L. REV. 905, 906 (1998) ("The common
characteristic of persons generally acknowledged to be fiduciaries is that
they possess access to property or assets for a defined or limited
purpose").
103. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 33 (discussing how profit
participants attempt to dispel the studios' assertions that no fiduciary
relationship exists in the studio-profit participant relationship).
104. See generally id.·
105. Id. (detailing profit participants' arguments that a fiduciary relationship
exists and therefore, they are entitled to an accounting from the
studios).
106. Id.
107. Id. (discussing studio arguments that no fiduciary relationship exists).
108. See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25, 30 (2003)
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss claim for breach of fiduciary
duty); Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't. Inc., 184 Cal. App. 4th 1298, 1312
(2010) (dismissing plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim on the
pleadings).
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those set forth in the contract. 109
Nonetheless, some participants
have achieved limited success in some circumstances in having a court
recognize a fiduciary relationship between a studio and a
participant. 110
A. Courts Do Not Recognize a Fiduciary Relationship in an Exclusive
Distribution Agreement But Suggests a Duty to Account For Revenues

Creative talent challenging .their diminished or complete lack of
contingent compensation base their argument for finding a fiduciary
relationship on a fifty-year-old decision suggesting a duty to account
for revenues earned in connection to a film's distribution. In Waverly
Productions, Inc. v. RKO General, Inc.,m a producer formed an
agreement with a studio to distribute two of the producer's films
around the globe and required payment of profit participation based
on revenues earned from the distribution of the films. 112
The
distributor, RKO, sublicensed the distribution rights to foreign
distributors and otherwise made sparse efforts to distribute the
films.11 3 Waverly, the producer, sued, claiming RKO's conduct
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. 114
The court rejected
Waverly's claim, holding "[t]he [distribution] contract is an elaborate
one which undertakes to define the respective rights and duties of the
parties ... [a] mere contract or a debt does not constitute a trust or
create a fiduciary relationship. "115 But the court went on to note "[I]t
[is] clear that RKO was not a fiduciary with respect to the
performance of the·terms of this contract (except as to accounting for
rentals received) and that arguments predicated on the assumption
that it was are directed at a false issue. "116
The dictum from Waverly was recognized in Recorded Picture
Co. (Productions) Ltd. v. Nelson Entertainment, Inc., 117 in which the
court found that no fiduciary relationship existed between a film
producer and distributor, and further, that no fiduciary relationship
existed between a film distributor and subdistributor, who have no

109. See infra Part III.A.
110. See infra Part III.C.
111. 217 Cal. App.2d 721 (1963).
112. Id. at 724-27.
113. Id. at 726 (detailing RKO's ability to sublicense distribution rights to
foreign distributers under the agreement).
114. Id. at 724.
115. Id. at 731-32.
116. Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
117. 53 Cal. App.4th 350 (1997).
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(2010) (dismissing plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim on the
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privity of contract.U 8 In Recorded Picture, the parties disputed the
amount of money owed to the producer from the sale of home videos
of the film The Last Emperor. 119 The producer, Recorded Picture,
entered into a distribution agreement with the Hemdale Film Corp.
that required all subdistributors to pay a percentage of the proceeds
directly to Recorded Picture, but Hemdale did not notify Nelson
Entertainment, one of the subdistributors, of this requirement. 120
After Hemdale filed for bankruptcy, Recorded Picture sued Nelson to
compel payment of seventy percent of home-video gross receipts
instead of the fifty percent Nelson initially arranged in the
subdistribution agreement with Hemdale. 121 The court found that
Nelson was not bound by the same terms as Hemdale because no
contract existed that would give rise to an obligation to account for
profits. 122 But the court, following Waverly, added that a contractual
relationship between Hemdale and Nelson gave rise to a "fiduciary
duty to the producer to provide an accounting of proceeds
received. "123 In other words, studios find support in court decisions
where an agreement grants the distributor an exclusive right to
distribute films and requires him to pay a percentage of the proceeds
to the owner .124 The parties do not form a special relationship in
these instances. 125
In other areas of the entertainment industry, courts have
recognized the requirement to pay money to a contractual partner
creates nothing more than a creditor-debtor relationship.
For
example, in Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, 126 the
appellate court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the
professional football league, holding the league's obligation to allocate

a share of profits to each team does not give rise to a joint venture
between the league and an individual team. 127
B.

A Fiduciary Relationship is Recognized Based on the Nature of the
Parties' Dealings

Participation agreements routinely disclaim the formation of any
heightened relationship between the studio and the talent participant
or ignore mention of it entirely. 128 In litigation, profit participants
attempt to transform breach of contract claims into tort claims
alleging reliance upon the studio to report the project's revenues
completely and accurately. 129 When the studio exercises exclusive
control over a project's financial information, the participant may
argue that a fiduciary relationship has been formed by implication,
meaning the burden of proof shifts to the studio to disprove the
existence of a fiduciary relationship. 13° Courts seldom accept such
implied fiduciary-duty claims, and frequently dismiss them on the
pleadings. 131 However, on rare occasions, these fiduciary duty claims
survive motions for summary judgment. 132
Despite disclaimers or silence in agreements, courts are willing to
find fiduciary relationships where the parties' conduct gives rise to an
association characterized as a partnership or joint venture. For
instance, in April Enterprises v. KTTV, 133 the renowned ventriloquist
Paul Winchell entered into an agreement with a television station,
KTTV, to produce a children's television program. 134 The contract
contained a profit-sharing provision in the event the program entered
into the syndication market. 135 Years after the program's broadcast
ended, the ventriloquist discovered that the station erased tape
recordings of the program, removing the program entirely from its

118. Id. at 374 (holding for the defendant, Nelson).
119. Id. at 356; THE LAST EMPEROR (Columbia Pictures 1987).
120. Recorded Picture, 53 Cal. App.4th at 357 (stating the provision was put
into the contract because producer "did not trust" distributor to collect
payments from subdistributors).
121. Id. at 356.
122. Id. at 363 ("We decline to adopt the rule proposed by the producersthat a company must comply with a contract to which it is not a party
if it has accepted even a portion of the benefits of that contract through
a subsequent, separate agreement with one of the original contracting
parties. Such a rule would lead to absurd consequences").
123. Id. at 371 n.10.

127. Id. at 592.
128. See, e.g., April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App.3d 805 (1983).
129. See, e.g., Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 26 Cal. App.3d 784 (1972).
130. See, e.g., Sander/Moses Prods., Inc. v. NBC Studios, Inc., 142 Cal.
App.4th 1086, 1095 (2006) (discussing standard and shifting burdens of
proof).
131. See, e.g., Ladd, v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298
(2010).
132. See, e.g., Celador Int'l Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846
(C.D.Cal. 2004). But see Sander/Moses, 142 Cal. App.4th at 1093
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding claim for
breach of fiduciary duty).

124. See, e.g., Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540, 542
(2d Cir. 1962) (characterizing the parties' agreement as an arm's-length
contract that does not rise to level of fiduciary).

133. April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App.3d 805 (1983).

125. Id.

134. Id. at 814.

126. 93 Cal. App.4th 572 (2001).

135. Id.
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privity of contract. 118 In Recorded Picture, the parties disputed the
amount of money owed to the producer from the sale of home videos
of the film The Last Emperor. 119 The producer, Recorded Picture,
entered into a distribution agreement with the Hemdale Film Corp.
that required all subdistributors to pay a percentage of the proceeds
directly to Recorded Picture, but Hemdale did not notify Nelso.n
Entertainment, one of the subdistributors, of this requirement. 120
After Hemdale filed for bankruptcy, Recorded Picture sued Nelson to
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instead of the fifty percent Nelson initially arranged in the
subdistribution agreement with Hemdale. 121 The court found that
Nelson was not bound by the same terms as Hemdale because no
contract existed that would give rise to an obligation to account for
profits. 122 But the court, following Waverly, added that a contractual
relationship between Hemdale and Nelson gave rise to a "fiduciary
duty to the producer to provide an accounting of proceeds
received. "123 In other words, studios find support in court decisions
where an agreement grants the distributor an exclusive right to
distribute films and requires him to pay a percentage of the proceeds
to the owner .124 The parties do not form a special relationship in
these instances. 125
In other areas of the entertainment industry, courts have
recognized the requirement to pay money to a contractual partner
creates nothing more than a creditor-debtor relationship.
For
example, in Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, 126 the
appellate court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the
professional football league, holding the league's obligation to allocate

a share of profits to each team does not give rise to a joint venture
between the league and an individual team. 127
B.

A Fiduciary Relationship is Recognized Based on the Nature of the
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alleging reliance upon the studio to report the project's revenues
completely and accurately. 129 When the studio exercises exclusive
control over a project's financial information, the participant may
argue that a fiduciary relationship has been formed by implication,
meaning the burden of proof shifts to the studio to disprove the
existence of a fiduciary relationship. 13° Courts seldom accept such
implied fiduciary-duty claims, and frequently dismiss them on the
pleadings. 131 However, on rare occasions, these fiduciary duty claims
survive motions for summary judgment. 132
Despite disclaimers or silence in agreements, courts are willing to
find fiduciary relationships where the parties' conduct gives rise to an
association characterized as a partnership or joint venture. For
instance, in April Enterprises v. KTTV, 133 the renowned ventriloquist
Paul Winchell entered into an agreement with a television station,
KTTV, to produce a children's television program. 134 The contract
contained a profit-sharing provision in the event the program entered
into the syndication market. 135 Years after the program's broadcast
ended, the ventriloquist discovered that the station erased tape
recordings of the program, removing the program entirely from its
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into the contract because producer "did not trust" distributor to collect
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library. 136 Winchell brought suit, and in its defense, KTTV pointed to
a disclaimer in the agreement stating the parties did not form a joint
venture; the court rejected this contention because it concluded that
parties' conduct may create a joint venture. 137
The relationship between a musician and a recording house has
faced similar questions regarding the creation of a fiduciary
relationship. 138 In Apple Records, Inc. v. Capital Records, Inc., 139 a
New York court found _the extensive, decade-spanning business
dealings between the recording studio and the Beatles gave rise to a
special relationship of trust and confidence. 140 The court stated that
the relationship "existed independent of the contractual duties" when
the recording studio distributed promotional records secretly to earn
goodwill with other bands and enhance its business. 141
A long history of business dealings involving payment obligations
also gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. In Carpenter Foundation v.
Oakes, 142 the plaintiff entrusted materials relating to the practice and
historical development of Christian Science to the defendant, a close
friend, to make available for "qualified" students of the religion at
cost .143 The defendant established a book business and sold materials
to customers contrary to the plaintiff's stated wishes. 144 The court
found the friendship forged between the parties was one of trust and
confidence; therefore, the defendant had a duty to make payments
outside of the contractual relationship. 145
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Based on Wolf, No Fiduciary Relationship Exists Between a Studio
and Participant on the Sole Basis of a Right to Share Profits

"?nder California law, one party's exclusive control over
contmgent comp_ensation does not make that party a fiduciary in the
absence of other evidence. 146 In Wolf v. Superior Court 147 the
appellate court denied a writ of mandate sought by Gar; Wolf
author of the 1981 novel Who Censored Roger Rabbit?, whose book
served as the basis for the Disney film Who Framed Roger Rabbit?.148
Wolf so~ght to. vacate a lower court's order sustaining demurrer to
Walt Disney Pictures and Television's demurrer for Wolf's claim of
breach of fiduciary duty. 149
The dispute in Wolf stemmed from an agreement between Wolf
and· J?isney. 150 Wal~ assigned the rights to his novel and the Roger
Rabbit characters m exchange for a salary and five percent of the
gross. re.venues earned from merchandising royalties or other
expl~itat10n of the Roger Rabbit characters. 151 The agreement also
provided Wolf audit rights so he could gain access to the movie's
books and records. 152
. Wolf alleged ~hat when he attempted to exercise his audit rights,
Disney refused him access to the relevant financial records and did
not disclose the nature of its promotional agreements with third
parties, including compensation. 153 Wolf also alleged that Disney
underreported revenues earned in connection with the exploitation of
the Rog~r R~bbit characters, constituting a breach of fiduciary duty
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.154

136. Id.
137. Id. at 820 ("[T]he conduct of the parties may create a joint venture
despite an express declaration to the contrary").
138. See Rodgers v. Roulette Records, 677 F. Supp. 731, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(declining to find a fiduciary relationship where defendant collected
royalties on behalf of plaintiff in the form of royalties and licensing fees);
Cooper v. Sony Records Int'l, No. 00 Civ. 233 (RMB), 2001 WL
1223492, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (musician's fiduciary duty claim fails
even though studio exercised exclusive control over the recordings
during the agreement and promised a percentage of the proceeds from
the exploitation of the recordings).

146. Wo.lf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25, 27 (2003) ("[C]ontingent
entitlement to future compensation within the exclusive control of one.
?ar~J'." does ~ot make that party a fiduciary in the absence of other
mdicia . . . . ) .
147. Id. at 25.

139. 137 A.D.2d 50 (1988).

148. Id. See WHO FRAMED ROGER RABBIT? (Walt Disney Pictures 1988); see
also
Who
Framed
Roger
Rabbit?,
Box
OFFICE
MoJO
h~tp://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=whoframedrogerrabbit.htm (last
visited .Mar. 11, 2012) (Who Framed Roger Rabbit'? was an enormous
box-office success, earning more than $300 million in worldwide revenues
after its release in 1988).

140. Id. at 57.

149. Wolf, 107 Cal. App.4th at 27.

141. Id.

150. Id.

142. 26 Cal. App.3d 784 (1972).

151. Id. at 27-28.

143. Id. at 788.

152. Id. at 28.

144. Id.

153. Id.

145. Id. at 798.

154. Id.
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Based on Wolf, No Fiduciary Relationship Exists Between a Studio
and Participant on the Sole Basis of a Right to Share Profits
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Under California law, one party's exclusive control over
contingent compensation does not make that party a fiduciary in the
absence of other evidence. 146 In Wolf v. Superior Court, 147 the
appellate court denied a writ of mandate sought by Gary Wolf,
author of the 1981 novel Who Censored Roger Rabbit?, whose book
served as the basis for the Disney film Who Framed Roger Rabbit?. 148
Wolf sought to vacate a lower court's order sustaining demurrer to
Walt Disney Pictures and Television's demurrer for Wolf's claim of
breach of fiduciary duty. 149
The dispute in Wolf stemmed from an agreement between Wolf
and· Disney. 150 Wolf assigned the rights to his novel and the Roger
Rabbit characters in exchange for a salary and five percent of the
gross revenues earned from merchandising royalties or other
exploitation of the Roger .Rabbit characters. 151 The agreement also
provided Wolf audit rights so he could gain access to the movie's
books and records. 152
Wolf alleged that when he attempted to exercise his audit rights,
Disney refused him access to the relevant financial records and did
not disclose the nature of its promotional agreements with third
parties, including compensation. 153 Wolf also alleged that Disney
underreported revenues earned in connection with the exploitation of
the Roger Rabbit characters, constituting a breach of fiduciary duty
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 154

136. Id.
137. Id. at 820 ("[T]he conduc_t of the parties ~~y create a joint venture
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138. See Rodgers v. Roulette Records, 677 F. Supp. 731, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
·
to find a fiduciary relationship where defendant collected
(-d eclimng
.
d li
· £ )·
royalties on behalf of plaintiff in the form of royalties an
censmg ees ,
Cooper v. Sony Records Int'l, No. 00 Civ. 233 (RMB), 20?1 ~L
1223492, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (musician's fiduciary duty claim ~ails
even though studio exercised exclusive control over the recordmgs
during the agreement and promised a percentage of the proceeds from
the exploitation of the recordings).
139. 137 A.D.2d 50 (1988).

146. Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25, 27 (2003) ("[C]ontingent
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The court rejected Wolf's assertion that Disney owed him a
fiduciary duty to account for revenues completely and accurately.155
Based on New v. New 156 and Wiltsee v. California Employment
157
Commission, the Court held that the right to receive contingent
compensation in the exclusive control of one party does not, by itself,
make the party a fiduciary for purposes of making payments. 158 It
went on to discredit Wolf's interpretation of the opinions in Waverly
and Nelson:
Wolf misapprehends the import of the Waverly court's recognition
of the producer's right to an accounting of proceeds received from
subdistributors. Either a relationship is fiduciary in character or not.
Whether the parties are fiduciaries is governed by the nature of the
relationship, not by the remedy sought. Waverly recognized simply
that RKO had a duty to account, not that RKO was a fiduciary with
respect to its accounting obligation. 159
In other words, a profit-sharing agreement may include a right to
an accounting even without a fiduciary relationship, when an
accounting is part and parcel to the contract. 160 The right of an
accounting, the court wrote, "can be derived not from a fiduciary
duty, but simply from the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inherent in every contract, because without an accounting,
there may be no way 'by which such [a] party [entitled to share in
profits] could determine whether there were any profits. "' 161
Factors such as fairness and practicality weighed in favor of
shifting the evidentiary burden to Disney to prove the relationship
with Wolf was not fiduciary in character when financial information
was held exclusively under Disney's control. 162 But the court found
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the evidentiary burden "does not alter the contractual nature of the
parties' relationship" and held that those factors "cannot serve to
create a fiduciary relationship where one does not otherwise exist. " 163
Judge Johnson's dissent in Wolf argued the majority opinion left
open a slim possibility for the court, if comprised of different judges,
to find favorably for the participant on important procedural
questions. 164 He suggested a different panel of judges would hold that
evidence put forth in support of the existence of a joint venture
should be admitted before the trial court because the evidence would
help determine the question of whether fiduciary duties existed as a
matter of law. 165 Sympathizing with Wolf, the dissent found it
premature to dismiss the claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the
pleadings. 166 In his opinion, he wrote:
[E]vidence may emerge demonstrating that once Disney decided
to make the movie and exploit the characters Wolf created, the
two of them embarked on a joint venture. If so, Disney would
owe a fiduciary duty to its co-adventurer even though the terms
of the written contract did not defined a joint· venture and
despite the fact Disney had managed to insert contract language
asserting this was only to be a debtor-creditor relationship. 167
If a fiduciary duty were imposed, it would potentially discourage
studios from using their superior bargaining position and transactional
knowledge to manipulate the participant into accepting a deal
promising a percentage of a pool of funds the studio intends to keep
as low as possible. 168 In a studio-participant relationship, "[t]he
opportunity and temptation to cheat are present in the relationship

155. Id. at 40-41.
156. 148 Cal. App.2d 372, 382 (1957) (ex-husband's contractual obligation to
pay former wife a percentage of stock earnings created a debt obligation
not a fiduciary duty).
'
157. 69 Cal. App.2d 120 (1945) (employment contract entitling employee to
253 of future profits neither created a joint venture nor gave rise to a
fiduciary relationship).
158. Wolf, 107 Cal. App.4th at 30-31. ("[T]he contractual right to contingent
compensation in the control of another has never, by itself been
sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship where one would not
otherwise exist.").
159. Id. at 34.
160. Id. ("The duty to provide an accounting of profits ... is appropriately
premised on the principle . . . that a party may have a right to
accounting, even absent a fiduciary relationship, when such a right is
inherent in the nature of the contract itself.").
161. Id. (citing Nelson, 29 Cal.2d at 751).
162. Id. at 36. ("In cases where the financial records essential to proving the
contingent compensation owed are in exclusive control of the defendant,

466

fundamental fairness, the "lodestar" for analysis . . . requires shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant. In such cases, the essential facts as to
the contingency and the amount owed lie in the exclusive knowledge
and control of the defendant, placing the defendant in a far better
position to prove satisfaction of its payment obligation.") (internal
citations omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 37 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 42. ("I am unprepared at this early stage of the proceedings, in
the absence of evidence before the trial court, to determine no such
fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law.").
167. Id. at 39-40.
168. Id. at 42. ("[T]here appears to be ... a need to impose a fiduciary duty
on the performance of that accounting responsibility in order to
discourage Disney 'from taking unfair advantage of' its special position .

.. '. ").
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The court rejected Wolf's assertion that Disney owed him a
fiduciary duty to account for revenues completely and accurately.155
Based on New v. N ew156 and Wiltsee v. California Employment
157
Commission, the Court held that the right to receive contingent
compensation in the exclusive control of one party does not, by itself,
make the party a fiduciary for purposes of making payments. 158 It
went on to discredit Wolf's interpretation of the opinions in Waverly
and Nelson:
Wolf misapprehends the import of the Waverly court's recognition
of the producer's right to an accounting of proceeds received from
subdistributors. Either a relationship is fiduciary in character or not.
Whether the parties are fiduciaries is governed by the nature of the
relationship, not by the remedy sought. Waverly recognized simply
that RKO had a duty to account, not that RKO was a fiduciary with
respect to its accounting obligation. 159
In other words, a profit-sharing agreement may include a right to
an accounting even without a fiduciary relationship, when an
accounting is part and parcel to the contract. 160 The right of an
accounting, the court wrote, "can be derived not from a fiduciary
duty, but simply from the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inherent in every contract, because without an accounting,
there may be no way 'by which such [a] party [entitled to share in
profits] could determine whether there were any profits. "' 161
Factors such as fairness and practicality weighed in favor of
shifting the evidentiary burden to Disney to prove the relationship
with Wolf was not fiduciary in character when financial information
was held exclusively under Disney's control. 162 But the court found
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the evidentiary burden "does not alter the contractual nature of the
parties' relationship" and held that those factors "cannot serve to
create a fiduciary relationship where one does not otherwise exist. " 163
Judge Johnson's dissent in Wolf argued the majority opinion left
open a slim possibility for the court, if comprised of different judges,
to find favorably for the participant on important procedural
questions. 164 He suggested a different panel of judges would hold that
evidence put forth in support of the existence of a joint venture
should be admitted before the trial court because the evidence would
help determine the question of whether fiduciary duties existed as a
matter of law. 165 Sympathizing with Wolf, the dissent found it
premature to dismiss the claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the
pleadings. 166 In his opinion, he wrote:
[E]vidence may emerge demonstrating that once Disney decided
to make the movie and exploit the characters Wolf created, the
two of them embarked on a joint venture. If so, Disney would
owe a fiduciary duty to its co-adventurer even though the terms
of the written contract did not defined a joint· venture and
despite the fact Disney had managed to insert contract language
asserting this was only to be a debtor-creditor relationship. 167
If a fiduciary duty were imposed, it would potentially discourage
studios from using their superior bargaining position and transactional
knowledge to manipulate the participant into accepting a deal
promising a percentage of a pool of funds the studio intends to keep
as low as possible. 168 In a studio-participant relationship, "[t]he
opportunity and temptation to cheat are present in the relationship

155. Id. at 40-41.
156. 148 Cal. App.2d 372, 382 (1957) (ex-husband's contractual obligation to
pay former wife a percentage of stock earnings created a debt obligation,
not a fiduciary duty).
157. 69 Cal. App.2d 120 (1945) (employment contract entitling employee to
253 of future profits neither created a joint venture nor gave rise to a
fiduciary relationship).
158. Wolf, 107 Cal. App.4th at 30-31. ("[T]he contractual right to contingent
compensation in the control of another has never, by itself, been
sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship where one would not
otherwise exist.").
159. Id. at 34.
160. Id. ("The duty to provide an accounting of profits ... is appropriately
premised on the principle . . . that a party may have a right to
accounting; even absent a fiduciary relationship, when such a right is
inherent in the nature of the contract itself.").
161. Id. (citing Nelson, 29 Cal.2d at 751).
162. Id. at 36. ("In cases where the financial records essential to proving the
contingent compensation owed are in exclusive control of the defendant,
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fundamental fairness, the "lodestar" for analysis ... requires shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant. In such cases, the essential facts as to
the contingency and the amount owed lie in the exclusive knowledge
and control ·of the defendant, placing the defendant in a far better
position to prove satisfaction of its payment obligation.") (internal
citations omitted).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 37 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 42. ("I am unprepared at this early stage of the proceedings, in
the absence of evidence before the trial court, to determine no such
fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law.").
167. Id. at 39-40.
168. Id. at 42. ("[T]here appears to be ... a need to impose a fiduciary duty
on the performance of that accounting responsibility in order to
discourage Disney 'from taking unfair advantage of' its special position .
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here just as much as in . . . traditional fiduciary relationships. "169
Each party understands that when Disney fails to report revenues
earned in connection with the sale of merchandise inspired by Wolf's
characters, the result would be "less money for Wolf and more profit
for Disney. "170
The dissent concludes on an auspicious note for participants,
stating that courts should be willing to "impose fiduciary duties on
certain business relationships. "171 In this case, Judge Johnson wrote
that he was, "not quite prepared to determine Disney assumed a
fiduciary duty to maintain honest and accurate records as to its
exploitation of Wolf's characters. But [that he was] close to such a
conclusion. "172
Interestingly, in Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 173 the
court did not allow Ladd, the producer, to present evidence in
support of his fiduciary duty claim at trial, 174 even though he and the
studio explicitly formed a joint venture in their original agreement. 175
The joint venture agreement stipulated that Ladd would produce
films that Warner would finance. 176 In addition, Ladd was authorized
to produce films without first obtaining the studio's approval, a right
to exercise discretion and control that few producers currently
enjoy. 177 According to Ladd's counsel, the original agreement included
language stating their relationship was special and, as a result, the
length of the contract was purposefully short. 178
When the agreement was terminated in 1985, Warner retained the
obligation to account to Ladd pursuant to the original agreement. 179
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Ladd filed suit after discovering that Warner had miscounted the
profits earned for the film Blade Runner. 180 The court rejected Ladd's
argument that the relationship was created under a joint venture
relationship and, therefore, activity stemming from that relationship
should be treated as a joint venture even though it was· terminated. 181
The duty to account is a fiduciary obligation because it was
established under the original agreement. 182 The judge dismissed the
claim on demurrer based on the reasoning in Wolf that once the
contract is terminated a joint venture no longer exists and therefore
no fiduciary duties are owed. 183
However, in Celador International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney
Co., 184 Judge Cooper of the Central District Court of California
declined to dismiss Celador's claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 185
The creators of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? had the opportunity
at trial to present evidence in support of a joint venture relationship
by virtue of the conduct of the parties, even though the contract
stipulated that it did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship. 186 But
the court went on to note that, based on Wolf, a fiduciary
relationship cannot be established solely on the foundation of a right
to share profits 187 nor on the basis of a duty to account for profits. 188
Nonetheless, the jury ultimately found that Disney breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case and

172. Id.

180. Id. at 1302 ("In 2001, Ladd learned [a] Blade Runner investor ... was
receiving payments from Warner even though Warner had told Lad the
movie was unprofitable .... Following [an] audit, Ladd filed this instant
lawsuit . . . . The gravamen of the action is that Warner deprived Ladd
of the bargained-for profit participation in the Termination Agreement
by undervaluing Ladd's films relative to other films in television
licensing packages."); BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982).

184. Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010).

181. See Gatti, supra nQte 176.

174. Id. (summarizing the procedural history of the case, including the fact
that the trial court "granted nonsuit on Ladd's claim for Blade Runner
profits .... ").

182. Id.

169. Id. at 41-42.
170. Id. at 42.
171. Id.

175. Id. at 1301. ("[I]n 1979, Warner and Ladd entered into a joint venture,
essentially a 'mini studio' within a studio.").
176. Id. {"Ladd had control over development of movies, financing of movies,
production, and distribution. Warner's role was to finance the films.").
177. Telephone Interview with John M. Gatti, Partner, Strook & Strook &
Lavan LLP (Mar. 8, 2012).
178. Id.
179. Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1301. ("In 1985, the parties entered into a
Termination Agreement, under which the parties ended their joint
venture, with Warner remaining obligated to pay Ladd the profit
participation called for under their earlier agreement.").
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183. Id.
184. 347 F. Supp.2d 846 (C.D.Cal. 2004).
185. Id. at 853-54 (explaining the defendants' argument in reliance on Wolf,
and how the present case may be distinguished by the plaintiffs'
allegations of the existence of something akin to a joint venture).
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188. Id. at 854 (noting that pursuant to Wolf "the duty to account for profits
does not give rise to a fiduciary relationship.").
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awarded a multimillion judgment in favor of the creators of the game
show. 189

covenant. The parties cannot disclaim or limit the obligation to act
in good faith by agreement. 195
The implied covenant is heavily litigated, but serves a narrow
purpose in interpretation of contracts. In litigation, it arises in
circumstances where the contract does not state how to deal with a
situation and where one party exploits the silence to thwart the right
of the other party to receive the promises the contract expressly
provided. 196 Since the contract does not prescribe whether the
conduct at issue is forbidden or permitted, the implied covenant is
used to determine if a party has acted in a manner that is
unreasonable according to industry standards of conduct and,
furthermore, if the party has acted in a manner it knew to be
wrong. 197 The purpose of the inquiry is to determine if the party
deliberately acted to frustrate the right of the other party to receive
the benefits the contract expressly provides; put differently, when the
implied covenant is applied it is "read into contracts in order to
protect the express covenants or promises of the contract. "198
Breach of the implied covenant involves "unfair dealing, whether
or not it also constitutes breach of a consensual contract term,
prompted by a conscious and deliberate act the 'unfairly frustrates
the agreed common purposes and .disappoints the reasonable
expectations of the other party. "' 199 The point is to "prevent one
contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to
receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. "200

IV. IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

This Section describes the purpose of the implied covenant and
explains recent court decisions where courts have devoted the issue
special attention. It concludes by arguing that the implied covenant
has provided and will continue to serve as the strongest legal theory
upon which participants base their claims to receive unpaid
contingent compensation.
A.

The Implied Covenant Protects the Unspoken Benefits a Party
Stands to Gain from the Express Terms of the Contract

In every contract there is an implied duty that neither party will
act to destroy or frustrate a right of the other party to benefit from
the express terms of the contract. 190 The implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is a staple of contract law, read into contracts
"in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract,
not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to
the contract's purpose." 191
Accordingly, nearly every American
jurisdiction recognizes this implied covenant as a matter of common
law. 192 Additionally, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 193
and the Uniform Commercial Code194 have adopted the implied

189. See infra Part IV(B.)
190. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d. 654, 658
(1958) ("There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the
right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement."); see also
Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 23 Cal.4th 390, 400
(2000); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 818 (1979);
Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit Inc., 222 Cal. App.3d 1371, 1393
(1990).
191. Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc., 2
Cal.4th 342, 373 (1992).
192. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp., 53 Cal.
App.4th 299, 314, (1997) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing . . . . This duty has been recognized
in the _majority of American jurisdictions . . . . ") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.").

195. See REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 7 (1997).
196. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d .373 (1988).
197. See generally, Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards
for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has
Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 4 7 HASTINGS
L.J. 585, 585 (1995-96) ("Despite its widespread recognition, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is shrouded in mystery."). Cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (Good faith is
violated "even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But
the oblig{'Ltion goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of
inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty.").
198. Foley, 765 P.2d at 394.
199. Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846, 852
(C.D.Cal. 2004) (citing Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 222
Cal. App.3d 1371, 1394 (1990)).

194. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2011..:2012) ("Every contract or duty within [the
Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance and enforcement.").

200. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (2000) (emphasis in
original).
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Accordingly, nearly every American
jurisdiction recognizes this implied covenant as a matter of common
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every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the
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192. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp., 53 Cal.
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violated "even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But
the obligi'.l,tion goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of
inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty.").
198. Foley, 765 P.2d at 394.
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B.

The Implied Covenant Is Not Violated When a Contract Grants
Complete Freedom to Perform an Act or Not

The implied covenant is not interpreted to forbid a party from
acting in a manner permitted in the contract. 201 For instance, a
contract granting a party complete discretion to do something
includes the right not to perform. If the conduct is within the
reasonable expectations of the parties as articulated expressly in the
contract, then a party "can never violate an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. "202
Good faith and fair dealing is the kind of provision that is hard to
derive generalizations from because it is very fact-specific, but case
law is a rich source for describing the subtleties and variations of
In Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, a record
interpretation.
company entered into an exclusive agreement with musician Tom
Waits to license one of his albums and pay him a percentage of
royalties earned in connection with the exploitation of the album. 203
The agreement provided the record company "may at [its] election
refrain" from marketing the album; Waits sued after the company
decided against promoting the album or licensing it in any way. 204
The court held for the record company, finding the language of the
contract granted them complete discretion to license the album and
that their decision against promoting it does not mean the company
·failed to act in good faith. 205 To find otherwise would imply a term
that contradicts an express term of the contract-something which
"courts are not at liberty" to do. 206 It is improper for courts perform
such a function "except in those relatively rare instances when
reading the provision literally would, contrary to the parties' clear
intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement. "207
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When the appellate court revisited Gary Wolf's campaign for
additional income in the form of contingent compensation from
Disney, it relied on Third Story in rendering its decision. At issue in
Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 208 born of the same facts
governing Wolf v. Superior Court, 209 was whether Disney violated the
implied covenant by entering into licensing and promotional
agreements for which Disney did not receive monetary
compensation. 210 Wolf alleged that Disney entered into such noncompensatory agreement to avoid having to account on its financial
books for additional revenues. 211 However, the contract provided
Disney "unfettered discretion . . . to license the Roger Rabbit
franchise as it 'saw fit.'" 212 On this basis, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court's decision to sustain the demurrer that Disney did not
breach the implied covenant. 213
The court dismissed Wolf's contention that the lower court erred
in not finding it unfair for Disney to enter into agreements with third
parties that do not promise Wolf any form of royalty payments. 214
Quoting from Third Story, the court added: "It is not enough to say
that without the proposed implied covenant, the contract would be
improvident or unwise or would operate unjustly. Parties have the
right to make such agreements ... [Wolf] was free to accept or reject
the bargain offered and cannot look to the courts to amend the terms
that prove unsatisfactory. "215
To establish a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff must show either that the
defendant knew he was acting in bad faith, or that the act was
intended to and did frustrate the common purpose of the contract. 216
208. Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 162 Cal. App.4th 1107
(2008).
209. Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25 (2003).

201. Carma Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., 2 Cal.4th 342, 374
("The general rule [of the duty of good faith and fair dealing] is plainly
subject to the exception that the parties may, by express provisions of
the contract, grant the right to engage in the very acts and conduct
which otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing . . . . "') ..
202. Id. at 376 (finding that a landlord's decision to terminate lease for his
own financial benefit does not violate the implied terms of the contract
because the lease agreement permitted the activity and was therefore
within the parties' reasonable expectations).
203. 41 Cal. App.4th 798, 805 (1995).

210. Wolf v. Walt Disney, 162 Cal. App.4th at 1121.
211. Id. at 1107.
212. Id. at 1121.
213. Id. at 1123 ("[T]he directed verdict was still proper because no
substantial evidence was presented from which a rational juror could
find the covenant had been breached."). .
214. Id. at 1120.
215. Id. at 1122 (citing Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App.4th
798, 809 (1995).
216. Id. at 1120 (citing Carma, Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California,
2 Cal.4th 342, 372 (1992) ("The covenant requires the party holding
such [discretionary] power to exercise it 'for a·ny purpose within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to
capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract
interpreted objectively."').
·

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 809.
207. Id. at 808.
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Based on the agreement at issue in Walt Disney Pictures and
Television, the court found no evidence that it was "designed to
thwart Wolf's right to a royalty or that all, or even most, of Disney's
licensing agreements were structured to require only nonmonetary
consideration. "217
C. The Implied Covenant Prohibits a Party from Deliberately
Frustrating the Expectations of the Counterparty as Expressed in the
Contract
But juries and judges are sympathetic to creative talent in cases
where it is alleged the studio made a fortune and would not share the
profits, especially when it is established at trial that the studio took
deliberate steps to ensure participants would not see a dime of
contingent compensation. In Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment,
218
Inc. , the film producer Alan Ladd, Jr. filed suit against Warner
Brothers challenging the studio's practice of "straight lining," where it
licenses a package of films to cable companies and assigns the same
value to every film regardless of the film's value to the studio or cable
company. 219 Ladd and Warner Brothers formed a joint venture in
1979 in which Ladd was given carte-blanche authority to develop and
produce films as well as control their marketing and distribution. 220
Warner financed the operations but did not have final say on which
movies were produced. 221 In his fiefdom, Ladd produced a series of
'popular movies, such as Blade Runner, 222 Chariots of Fire, 223 and the
Police Academy224 franchise. When the parties terminated their jointventure agreement six years later, the termination agreement
provided that the studio would continue to pay five percent of gross
revenues from the licensing of the films produced by Ladd, except for
Chariots of Fire, for which he would receive two-and-a-half percent. 225
In 1992, Warner did not include Blade Runner in the profit
participation statement it delivered to Ladd, representing that the
film did not recoup its costs and was "so far in the red [losing $19.5
million] it was not worthwhile to issue [profit] statements." 226
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Knowing the studio's obligation to act fairly and in good faith, Ladd
did not dispute the representation.
In 2001, however, Ladd
discovered that Warner was making contingent-compensation
payments to another investor on Blade Runner, prompting him to
exercise his right to audit. The audit revealed that the film was
making money hand over fist. 227
At issue in Ladd was the practice of "straight-lining," where a
studio licenses a package of films to cable companies and assigns the
same value to every film in the package, regardless of each film's
comparative value. 228 For instance, if a studio licenses a package of
twenty films to a cable company for $20 million, the studio might
then allocate $1 million for each film's balance sheet. The $1 million
is reported, in part, for purposes of making profit-participation
payments. However, some films in the package might be worth $1
million or more. The participants in those films would argue that the
studio deprived them of an accurate accounting by not giving a fair
allocation to each film based on its relative value as part of the
package. 229
Ladd challenged the straight-lining method, arguing it ignored the
true value of each film and, therefore, deprived him of the share of
profits he expected to earn in licensing fees. 230 At trial, a Warner
Brothers executive testified that acting in good faith includes the duty
to "fairly and accurately allocate licensee fees to each of the films
based on their comparative value as part of the package. "231 As a
profit participant, Ladd argued the studio violated the implied
covenant by assigning the same value to blockbusters as flops, since
the studio is expected to report a film's revenues truthfully and
accurately. 232
Internally, Warner Brothers evaluated each film's

227. Id. at 1302.
228. Id.

217. Id. at 1123.

229. See, e.g., id. at 1300 ("The gravamen of Ladd's action against Warner is
that by allocating the same portion of the licensing fee to every movie in
a package without regard to the true value of each movie, Warner
deprived Ladd of a fair allocation of the licensing fees to which Ladd
was entitled as a profit participant.").

218. 184 Cal. App.4th, 1298 (2010).
219. Id. at 1298.
220. Id. at 1301.
221. Id.
222. BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982).
223. CHARIOTS OF FIRE (Warner Bros. 1981).
224. POLICE ACADEMY (Warner Bros. 1984).
225. Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1303.
226. Id. at 1301.

230. Id. at 1303. ("The problem was that Warner allocated the same
proportion of the license fee to each title in the package, irrespective of
the film's letter grade. Simon opined that in treating every movie as
though it had the same value, "the studio was not doing its expert
work, as a provider or distributor of content, in weighing the value of
each of these titles .... ").
231. Id. at 1307.
232. Id. at 1306-07.
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Based on the agreement at issue in Walt Disney Pictures and
Television, the court found no evidence that it was "designed to
thwart Wolf's right to a royalty or that all, or even most, of Disney's
licensing agreements were structured to require only nonmonetary
consideration. "217
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Contract

But juries and judges are sympathetic to creative talent in cases
where it is alleged the studio made a fortune and would not share the
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218
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revenues from the licensing of the films produced by Ladd, except for
Chariots of Fire, for which he would receive two-and-a-half percent. 225
In 1992, Warner did not include Blade Runner in the profit
participation statement it delivered to Ladd, representing that the
film did not recoup its costs and was "so far in the red [losing $19.5
million] it was not worthwhile to issue [profit] statements. "226
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Knowing the studio's obligation to act fairly and in good faith, Ladd
In 2001, however, Ladd
did not dispute the representation.
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studio licenses a package of films to cable companies and assigns the
same value to every film in the package, regardless of each film's
comparative value. 228 For instance, if a studio licenses a package of
twenty films to a cable company for $20 million, the studio might
then allocate $1 million for each film's balance sheet. The $1 million
is reported, in part, for purposes of making profit-participation
payments. However, some films in the package might be worth $1
million or more. The participants in those films would argue that the
studio deprived them of an accurate accounting by not giving a fair
allocation to each film based on its relative value as part of the
package. 229
Ladd challenged the straight-lining method, arguing it ignored the
true value of each film and, therefore, deprived him of the share of
profits he expected to earn in licensing fees. 230 At trial, a Warner
Brothers executive testified that acting in good faith includes the duty
to "fairly and accurately allocate licensee fees to each of the films
based on their comparative value as part of the package. "231 As a
profit participant, Ladd argued the studio violated the implied
covenant by assigning the same value to blockbusters as flops, since
the studio is expected to report a film's revenues truthfully and
accurately. 232
Internally, Warner Brothers evaluated each film's
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that by allocating the same portion of the licensing fee to every movie in
a package without regard to the true value of each movie, Warner
deprived Ladd of a fair allocation of the licensing fees to which Ladd
was entitled as a profit participant.").

218. 184 Cal. App.4th, 1298 (2010).
219. Id. at 1298.
220. Id. at 1301.
221. Id.
222. BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982).
223. CHARIOTS OF FIRE (Warner Bros. 1981).
224. POLICE ACADEMY (Warner Bros. 1984).
225. Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1303.
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230. Id. at 1303. ("The problem was that Warner allocated the same
proportion of the license fee to each title in the package, irrespective of
the film's letter grade. Simon opined that in treating every movie as
though it had the same value, "the studio was not doing its expert
work, as a provider or distributor of content, in weighing the value of
each of these titles .... ").
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relative value by assigning a grade of A, B, or C, an exercise that
violates the duty to act in good faith. 233
Moreover, Ladd alleged that Warner undervalued the package of
films by $97 million. 234 The jury agreed with Ladd and concluded
that Warner's improper accounting resulted in an underpayment of
more than $3 million in contingent compensation. 235 On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed, holding the implied covenant obliged the
studio to "fairly and accurately allocate license fees to each of the
films based on their comparative value as part of a package. "236 The
court also noted the straight-lining method violates the implied
covenant because bundling deprives the films of individual
valuation. 237
When a television program such as Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire? becomes so popular that the program itself is a household
name, it is hard to believe a studio that claims it failed to earn profits
sufficient to pay contingent compensation. In July 2010, a federal
jury found in favor of Celador International, the British production
company that created the game show, and awarded damages of $260
million in unpaid licensing fees and $9.2 million in money owed from
merchandising royalties. 238 The jury also found that Disney breached
its obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly with Celador when it
took deliberate steps to deprive the creators of their share of
contingent compensation in connection with Millionaire. 239
In
September 2010, a federal judge awarded the creators an additional
$50 million in prejudgment interest. 240

The Celador decision stems from the contract Celador entered
into in 1999 with the ABC television network and Buena Vista
Television ("BVT")-both of which are Walt Disney companies-to
develop, produce, and. syndicate the popular game show for broadcast
in the United States. 241 The contract provided that Celador would
receive 50 percent of the "Defined Contingent Compensation" (i.e.,
net profits) derived from the exploitation of the series by ABC and
BVT. 242 The Disney companies tapped Valleycrest Productionsanother Disney subsidiary-to handle production duties for
Millionaire, including the responsibility to license the show to
broadcasters. 243
Millionaire, the game show hosted by Regis Philbin, became an
overnight success, skyrocketing to the top of the Nielsen ratings for
the most-watched television show in the United States. 244 On the
heels of the show's enormous success, ABC moved to first place in the
network ratings war. 245 Millionaire has been on the air for longer than
a decade, the first three years on ABC and since airing multiple days
per week in syndication. 246 However, according to Celador, the

233. Id. at 1307.
234. Id. at 1303. ("With respect to damages, Simon determined Warner
should have allocated an additional $97 million in licensing fees to
Ladd's films.").
235. Id. at 1298.
236. Id. at 1300.
237. Id. ("Therefore, the record supports the jury's determination that
Warner's straight-lining method of allocating licensing fees to profit
participants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.").
238. Sue Manning, Disney-Celador Lawsuit Verdict: Disney Ordered to Pay
'Millionaire' Makers $269.2 Million, HUFF. PO$T (Jul. 7, 2010, 5:55 PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010 /07 /07 / disneycelador-lawsuitver_n_638518.html ("The jury awarded $260 -million in license fees and
$9.2 million for merchandising claims, which were made based on $70
million in sales of a home edition of the game show.").
239. Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846, 850 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (denying Disney's motion to dismiss the claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/12/judgedenies-disneys-request-for-new-trial-in-millionaire-dispute.html
("[The
judge] later tacked on $50 million in prejudgment interest to be paid to
Celador.").
241. Celador, 347 F. Supp:2d at 850. ("Plaintiffs are the creators and
executive producers of the television game show, 'Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire[?]' .... Plaintiffs entered into a contract in 1998 with ABC
and BVT, both subsidiaries of Defendant Walt Disney Co. . . . wherein
the parties 'agreed to become 50-50 partners with respect to the
production, distribution and exploitation of the Series in North
America.'").
242. Id. ("Plaintiffs allege that in exchange for certain rights to the concept
and format of [Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?], ABC and BVT agreed
to (1) pay Celador fixed compensation and 503 of Defined Contingent
Compensation derived from the exploitation of the series .... ").
243. Id. ("After the agreement was entered into, Plaintiffs allege that ABC
and BVT assigned the production duties of [Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire?] to their fellow subsidiary of Disney, Valleycrest Prod.
Ltd.").
244. Linda Moss,
'Millionaire' Rained on Cable's May Parade,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jun. 5, 2000, at 30 ("The only one of the four
broadcast networks to actually see a ratings increase in primetime was
ABC, with lethal programming weapon Millionaire giving it a whopping
29 percent bump, to a 9.9 from a 7.7, which drove broadcast's gains.").
245. Id.

240. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Judge denies Disney's request for new trial in
'Millionaire' dispute, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, available at

246. See Edvard Pettersson, Disney seeks reversal of $319 Million
"Millionaire" Loss, BLOOMBERG (Oct 10, 2012, 3:18 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-10/disney-seeks-reversal-of319-million-millionaire-loss.html (discussing Celador's contract with
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relative value by assigning a grade of A, B, or C, an exercise that
violates the duty to act in good faith. 233
Moreover, Ladd alleged that Warner undervalued the package of
films by $97 million. 234 The jury agreed with Ladd and concluded
that Warner's improper accounting resulted in an underpayment of
more than $3 million in contingent compensation. 235 On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed, holding the implied covenant obliged the
studio to "fairly and accurately allocate license fees to each of the
films based on their comparative value as part of a package. "236 The
court also noted the straight-lining method violates the implied
covenant because bundling deprives the films of individual
valuation. 237
When a television program such as Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire? becomes so popular that the program itself is a household
name, it is hard to believe a studio that claims it failed to earn profits
sufficient to pay contingent compensation. In July 2010, a federal
jury found in favor of Celador International, the British production
company that created the game show, and awarded damages of $260
million in unpaid licensing fees and $9.2 million in money owed from
merchandising royalties. 238 The jury also found that Disney breached
its obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly with Celador when it
took deliberate steps to deprive the creators of their share of
In
contingent compensation in connection with Millionaire. 239
September 2010, a federal judge awarded the creators an additional
$50 million in prejudgment interest. 240

The Celador decision stems from the contract Celador entered
into in 1999 with the ABC television network and Buena Vista
Television ("BVT")-both of which are Walt Disney companies-to
develop, produce, and. syndicate the popular game show for broadcast
in the United States. 241 The contract provided that Celador would
receive 50 percent of the "Defined Contingent Compensation" (i.e.,
net profits) derived from the exploitation of the series by ABC and
BVT. 242 The Disney companies tapped Valleycrest Productionsanother Disney subsidiary-to handle production duties for
Millionaire, including the responsibility to license the show to
broadcasters. 243
Millionaire, the game show hosted by Regis Philbin, became an
overnight success, skyrocketing to the top of the Nielsen ratings for
the most-watched television show in the United States. 244 On the
heels of the show's enormous success, ABC moved to first place in the
network ratings war. 245 Millionaire has been on the air for longer than
a decade, the first three years on ABC and since airing multiple days
per week in syndication. 246 However, according to Celador, the

233. Id. at 1307.
234. Id. at 1303. ("With respect to damages, Simon determined Warner
should have allocated an additional $97 million in licensing fees to
Ladd's films.").
235. Id. at 1298.
236. Id. at 1300.
237. Id. ("Therefore, the record supports the jury's determination that
Warner's straight-lining method of allocating licensing fees to profit
participants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.").
238. Sue Manning, Disney-Celador Lawsuit Verdict: Disney Ordered to Pay
'Millionaire' Makers $269.2 Million, HUFF. POST (Jul. 7, 2010, 5:55 PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07 /07 /disneycelador-lawsuitver_n_638518.html ("The jury awarded $260 million in license fees and
$9.2 million for merchandising claims, which were made based on $70
million in sales of a home edition of the game show.").
239. Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846, 850 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (denying Disney's motion to dismiss the claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/12/judgedenies-disneys-request-for-new-trial-in-millionaire-dispute.html
(" [The
judge] later tacked on $50 million in prejudgment interest to be paid to
Celador. ").
241. Celador, 347 F. Supp:2d at 850. ("Plaintiffs are the creators and
executive producers of the television game show, 'Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire[?]' .... Plaintiffs entered into a contract in 1998 with ABC
and BVT, both subsidiaries of Defendant Walt Disney Co . . . . wherein
the parties 'agreed to become 50-50 partners with respect to the
production, distribution and exploitation of the Series in North
America."').
242. Id. ("Plaintiffs allege that in exchange for certain rights to the concept
and format of [Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?], ABC and BVT agreed
to (1) pay Celador fixed compensation and 503 of Defined Contingent
Compensation derived from the exploitation of the series .... ").
243. Id. ("After the agreement was entered into, Plaintiffs allege that ABC
and BVT assigned the production duties of [Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire?] to their fellow subsidiary of Disney, Valleycrest Prod.
Ltd.").
244. Linda Moss,
'Millionaire' Rained on Cable's May Parade,
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jun. 5, 2000, at 30 ("The only one of the four
broadcast networks to actually see a ratings increase in primetime was
ABC, with lethal programming weapon Millionaire giving it a whopping
29 percent bump, to a 9.9 from a 7.7, which drove broadcast's gains.").
245. Id.

240. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Judge denies Disney's request for new trial in
'Millionaire' dispute, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, available at

246. See Edvard Pettersson, Disney seeks reversal of $319 Million
"Millionaire" Loss, BLOOMBERG (Oct 10, 2012, 3:18 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-10/disney-seeks-reversal-of319-million-millionaire-loss.html (discussing Celador's contract with
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accounting statements generated by Disney reported the show did not
recoup its production costs and was running a loss of $70 million. 247
How can a fifty-percent profit share in a popular television show,
which generates millions of dollars in revenues for Disney and its
affiliates, result in zero profits for its British creators? The answer
lies in the way ABC and BVT orchestrated a series of backchannel
transactions-without Celador's knowledge-with Disney affiliates to
shelter revenue earned by the show. For instance, Celador claimed
that ABC agreed orally to license the broadcast rights in the show
from Valleycrest for a per-episode fee equal to the amount of
The
Valleycrest's production costs on a per-episode basis. 248
arrangement effectively eliminated Celador's ability to receive its netprofits payments, because the amount of contingent compensation
Celador would receive depended on how much in license fees
Valleycrest collected from broadcasters as well as on Valleycrest's
production costs. 249
According to Celador, the arrangement between the Disney
affiliates enabled Valleycrest to charge below-market licensing fees
while having no effect on the profit earned by Disney itself. 250 That is
largely because the contract ,.,entitled Celador to share only in
Valleycrest's profits from the show-not Disney's. 251 In addition, it is
customary in the entertainment industry for a production company to
renegotiate higher license fees for enormously successful shows even

though it is not mandated by the agreement. 252 The purposes of the
self-dealing transactions, according to Celador, were to shelter revenue
and retain profits within Disney's control. 253
Before the jury verdict, Judge Cooper denied Disney's motions to
dismiss for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant
under an exception that allowed Celador to present evidence
demonstrating the Disney companies "frustrated a benefit of the
contract," which was the benefit to receive contingent compensation
The court based its decision to deny Disney's
from the show. 254
motion on evidence that Disney "failed to renegotiate contracts in a
manner consistent with industry custom, "255 and that, in ·making
sweetheart licensing deals with affiliates, its agreements were "not fair
and reasonable. "256 Despite a provision in the contract granting ABC
and BVT the right to self-deal and requiring Celador to prove that a
specific deal was unfair, 257 the court acknowledged that there was
sufficient evidence that this was indeed in the case. 258 In future cases,
this finding will likely encourage participants to challenge accounting
statements based on presumptions of fairness and equity.

Disney and providing background and syndication information about
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?.)
247. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law at 13,
Celador, 347 F. Supp.2d 846.
248. Celador, 347 F. Supp.2d at 850 (citing Complaint at , 9) ("As part of
the agreement with Valleycrest, Plaintiffs claim that ABC agreed orally
to license the Series for an "imputed per-episode license fee equal to
Valleycrest 's per-episode production costs.").

V.

CONCLUSION

The obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly with
contractual partners does not prohibit a studio from acting in its
interests under an agreement. Nor do fiduciary duties, which do not
252. Id. at 850-51 (citing Complaint at , 14) ("Plaintiffs allege that it is the
custom and practice in the entertainment industry to renegotiate higher
licensing fees when a show is highly successful.").
253. Id. (citing Complaint at , 16).
254. Id. at 853.
255. Id. at 852.
256. Id.

250. Id. at 851 (citing Complaint at , 16) ("Plaintiff alleges that because
ABC and BVT are required to share the profits derived from the Series
with Celador, it is in Disney's best interest, as the parent company of
ABC, BVT and Valleycrest, for the license with ABC to be less than
the fair market price for the right to license the Series and for
Valleycrest to inflate its production costs.").

257. Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 38, at 40 (citing Trial Exhibit No. 33,
Celador, 347 F. Supp. 2d. 846) (provision reads that "Owner
acknowledges and agrees that any agreement or other arrangement by
ABC /BVT with an Affiliate or Related Party shall be conclusively
presumed to be fair, reasonable and unobjectionable unless Owner shall
establish that such agreement or other arrangement is on non-unique
financial terms which, taken as a whole, are materially less favorable
economically to ABC /BVT . . . Owner further agrees that ... Owner's
sole and exclusive remedy [to unfavorable transactions] shall be the right
to receive an adjusted accounting statement, including any additional
payments that may be required.").

251. Id. ("Plaintiffs allege, 'Profits from lower production costs and increased
revenues from the Series, which would have flowed to Celador if paid to
BVT, remain instead with the Disney empire, in the form of cost
savings and increased profits to Disney's affiliates."').

258. Celador, 347 F.
never intended
Plaintiffs have
information and

249. Id .. (As a result, the network exhibition of the Series could never reach
profits after production costs, distribution fees, distribution costs,
overhead, interest, etc. were deducted from any gross receipts).

478

Supp.2d at 856 ("[I]t can be inferred that Defendants
to seek competitive bids or profitable licensing fees.
sufficiently stated the basis for their allegations on
be~ief. ").
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accounting statements generated by Disney reported the show did not
recoup its production costs and was running a loss of $70 million. 247
How can a fifty-percent profit share in a popular television show,
which generates millions of dollars in revenues for Disney and its
affiliates, result in zero profits for its British creators? The answer
lies in the way ABC and BVT orchestrated a series of backchannel
transactions-without Celador's knowledge-with Disney affiliates to
shelter revenue earned by the show. For instance, Celador claimed
that ABC agreed orally to license the broadcast rights in the show
from Valleycrest for a per-episode fee equal to the amount of
Valleycrest's production costs on a per-episode basis. 248
The
arrangement effectively eliminated Celador's ability to receive its netprofits payments, because the amount of contingent compensation
Celador would receive depended on how much in license fees
Valleycrest collected from broadcasters as well as on Valleycrest's
production costs. 249
According to Celador, the arrangement between the Disney
affiliates enabled Valleycrest to charge below-market licensing fees
while having no effect on the profit earned by Disney itself. 250 That is
largely because the contract ~ntitled Celador to share only in
Valleycrest's profits from the show-not Disney's. 251 In addition, it is
customary in the entertainment industry for a production company to
renegotiate higher license fees for enormously successful shows even

though it is not mandated by the agreement. 252 The purposes of the
self-dealing transactions, according to Celador, were to shelter revenue
and retain profits within Disney's control. 253
Before the jury verdict, Judge Cooper denied Disney's motions to
dismiss for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant
under an exception that allowed Celador to present evidence
demonstrating the Disney companies "frustrated a benefit of the
contract," which was the benefit to receive contingent compensation
The court based its decision to deny Disney's
from the show. 254
motion on evidence that Disney "failed to renegotiate contracts in a
manner consistent with industry custom," 255 and that, in ·making
sweetheart licensing deals with affiliates, its agreements were "not fair
and reasonable. "256 Despite a provision in the contract granting ABC
and BVT the right to self-deal and requiring Celador to prove that a
specific deal was unfair, 257 the court acknowledged that there was
sufficient evidence that this was indeed in the case. 258 In future cases,
this finding will likely encourage participants to challenge accounting
statements based on presumptions of fairness and equity.
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Valleycrest 's per-episode production costs.'').
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ABC and BVT are required to share the profits derived from the Series
with Celador, it is in Disney's best interest, as the parent company of
ABC, BVT and Valleycrest, for the license with ABC to be less than
the fair market price for the right to license the Series and for
Valleycrest to inflate its production costs.").

257. Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 38, at 40 (citing Trial Exhibit No. 33,
Celador, 347 F. Supp. 2d. 846) (provision reads that "Owner
acknowledges and agrees that any agreement or other arrangement by
ABC/BVT with an Affiliate or Related Party shall be conclusively
presumed to be fair, reasonable and unobjectionable unless Owner shall
establish that such agreement or other arrangement is on non-unique
financial terms which, taken as a whole, are materially less favorable
economically to ABC /BVT . . . Owner further agrees that . . . Owner's
sole and exclusive remedy [to unfavorable transactions] shall be the right
to receive an adjusted accounting statement, including any additional
payments that may be required.").

251. Id. ("Plaintiffs allege, 'Profits from lower production costs and increased
revenues from the Series, which would have flowed to Celador if paid to
BVT, remain instead with the Disney empire, in the form of cost
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arise in profit-participation agreements unless the studio-participant
relationship parallels that of partners in a partnership-an
arrangement that is seldom the case. So the profit participant is still
at risk of being deprived of its promised share of contingent
compensation when dealing with studios-unless the participant
himself has the financial resources to challenge a suspicious
participation statement. In these scenarios, the participant becomes a
sympathetic character, someone who has little option but to repose
trust and confidence in the studio to account fully and accurately his
share of net profits in a successful project, but who knows the studio
will fight him tooth and nail over every penny of supplemental
income.
Despite the features of the studio-participant relationship, it is
highly unlikely that a court will be persuaded to go against the Wolf
v. Superior Court 259 holding and declare that a fiduciary relationship
exists. Its characteristics are similar to those found in relationships
between manufacturers and distributors, those at the heart of
commercial industries. 26° For instance, the participant is akin to a
manufacturer of intellectual property, a product that is distributed by
the studio throughout the world as best it can. The parties share the
proceeds of their joint efforts as previously bargained.
If the
distributor fails to pay money owed under the contract, it creates a
debt obligation. However, a debt is not a trust and it does not create
a fiduciary relationship-regardless of whether the debt is of a certain
amount or is contingent on future events whose certainty is unknown.
261
It is also true that if courts recognize fiduciary duties that studios
will respond by disclaiming fiduciary duties.
Yet, courts should not dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims too
quickly. The Wolf decision left open the possibility for a fiduciary
relationship to be recognized on factors other than the right to receive
contingent compensation-and the participant should be given an
opportunity to present evidence at trial demonstrating his additional
responsibilities on the project. If the studio and production company
enter into an agreement that not only has a profit-sharing mechanism
but also has other co-ownership features-Le., each of them finances
production, engages his own distributors, works together side by side,
and brings in revenues that it accounts to its contractual partnerthere is a situation where the parties formed a partnership by

implication, even if they did not intend to or explicitly· disclaimed the
creation of one.
If courts find the studio-participant relationship to be fiduciary in
character, the participant would be afforded substantially more
bargaining power in its negotiations. Reducing the disparity· of
bargaining power might encourage more transparent dealings and
discourage studios from manipulating accounting statements for their
financial benefit. For vertically integrated companies, the prospect of
·owing punitive damages in addition to ordinary damages might
encourage them to seek higher bids to license a successful television
series from unaffiliated companies.
Juries have found that a concerted effort to deprive participants
their share of net profits is acting in bad faith-and the studios'
actions in Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. 262 and Celador
International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Compan'!}2 63 were condemnedresulting in significant rewards in damages. Those decisions and
findings suggest an explicit right to contingent compensation includes
an implied right to reasonable access to information and a reasonably
accurate accounting of revenues. Nonetheless, it is difficult to predict
outcomes based on these factors in cases where the duty to act in
good faith is involved since they depend significantly on the facts of a
given dispute. Determining a party has not acted in good faith
depends on the size, facts, and circumstances surrounding the
transaction and the particular risks and expectations of the parties
when they entered into the agreement. In addition, since this area of
iaw is so fact-specific it may be hard to render consistent applications
to similar cases, as fact finders may substitute their own intuition of
what constitutes reasonable expectations under the circumstances.
To illustrate, the contract in Ladd did not state how the studio
would allocate fees earned by licensing a package of films. 264 Ladd
argued for an allocation to take into account the relative values of the
individual films, whereas Warner Brothers believed it could be
Without a
allocated without comparing each film's value. 265
settlement, a fact finder had to make the determination. The jury
concluded the studio's method of allocation was unfair, 266 but it is also
possible for a different jury to have found that what the studio did
was neither unreasonable according to industry standards nor was it a
subjective act of bad faith to frustrate the participant's right to
receive contingent compensation.

259. 107 Cal. App.4th 25 (2003} (holding that the right to receive contingent
compensation in the exclusive control of one party does not, by itself,
make the party a fiduciary for purposes of making payments).
260. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 154-55.
261. Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App.2d 323, 333, 227 P.2d 484, 490
(1951) ("A debt is not a trust and there is not a fiduciary relation
between debtor and creditor as such.").
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RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF

The facts do not lead to a predictable outcome because the
implied terms of the contract do not state how to perform in a specific
situation. One party can take advantage of the contractual silence to
thwart the right of the counterparty to receive what is provided for
expressly in the contract. Fact finders can review the same evidence
and come to different legal conclusions. As a result, bringing a net
profits case into a courtroom means the parties are entering into a
high stakes affair where millions of dollars are on the line and an
interpretation of the relevant legal doctrine does not lead to
predictable outcomes. The question for both creative talent and
studios is whether they are willing to roll the dice.

lNTRABRAND COMPETITION IN HIGH
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS: THE
PROBLEM WITH LARGE RETAILORS

&

VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS
By Kyle Colonna*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The current antitrust regime places a premium on interbrand
competition. 1 Interbrand competition is competition between brands, 2
such as Apple competing with Google in the smartphone market. 3
Intrabrand competition is, on the other hand, competition within a
brand. 4 For example, intrabrand competition occurs when Apple
stores compete with each other or when Apple stores compete with
Wal-Mart stores that sell Apple products. 5 In many instances, the
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1.

Carlo Luis Rodes, Note, Giving Teeth to Sherman Act Enforcement in
tthe Intrabrand Context: Weaning Courts off Their Interbrand Addiction
Post-Sylvania, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 957, 966 (2008-2009) (arguing
for stricter judicial scrutiny of anti-competitive behavior in the
intrabrand context).

2.

Cont'l T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52, n.19 (1977) (addressing
whether a television manufacturer could place territorial restrictions on
its franchised retailers under section 1 of the Sherman Act).

3.

See Harry McCracken, iPhone v. Android: The Smart Phone Wars Rage
On, TIME (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/
0,8599,2023452,00.html (noting "the battle between the iPhone and
Android is in its early stages").

4.

Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 ("Intrabrand competition is the
competition between the distributors - wholesale or retail - of the
product of a particular manufacturer.").

5.

The key to determining intrabrand competition is correctly defining the
product or service the party provides. For instance, an Apple Store that
sells iPhones and a nearby cellular service provider that sells iPhones is
intrabrand competition. The same label, i.e., Apple, is being sold at
different distributors. At the interbrand level, however, Apple and
Google compete in the smart phone market. The cellular service
provider is a retailer of a service. So it competes interbrand against
other cellular service providers.
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